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357 
IS DISPARATE IMPACT HAVING ANY 
IMPACT?  AN APPELLATE ANALYSIS OF 
FORTY YEARS OF DISPARATE IMPACT 
CLAIMS UNDER THE FAIR HOUSING ACT 
STACY E. SEICSHNAYDRE* 
After four decades of unanimity in the circuit courts, with several denials of 
certiorari by the Supreme Court, the Court has recently granted certiorari in 
two cases to resolve the apparently settled question of whether the disparate 
impact theory is cognizable under the Fair Housing Act (FHA).  Although 
these two recent cases, Magner v. Gallagher and Mount Holly v. Mount 
Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc., may have raised questions about 
the potential reach of disparate impact theory, they are not representative FHA 
cases with respect to their outcomes or their facts.  The circuit courts in both 
cases reversed summary judgment and reinstated plaintiffs’ disparate impact 
claims, which is exceedingly rare given its occurrence only twice before in forty 
years.  In general, plaintiffs have obtained positive outcomes in only 20% of 
their FHA disparate impact claims considered on appeal.  Further, plaintiffs’ 
positive FHA disparate impact outcomes have been affirmed only 33.3 % of 
the time, compared with defendants’ affirmance rate of 83.8%.  The facts of 
Magner and Mount Holly are not representative considering that these 
disparate impact challenges were made against housing improvement plans, 
rather than housing barriers.  Housing improvement challenges typically seek 
to prevent the disproportionate displacement of minorities from existing 
housing opportunities, whereas housing barrier challenges seek to remove 
barriers and create housing opportunities for minorities where they do not 
presently exist.  Only one other housing improvement case prior to Magner 
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Author would like to acknowledge the invaluable feedback and editorial assistance 
received from Stephen M. Dane, Joseph Rich, Florence W. Roisman, Robert G. 
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and Mount Holly had resulted in a positive outcome for plaintiffs in forty 
years.  Housing barrier challenges almost always further the 
nondiscrimination and integration purposes of the FHA.  Housing 
improvement challenges may or may not further the purposes of the FHA, 
depending on the facts of the case.  This means that summary judgment will 
not be appropriate in some housing improvement cases.  Housing barrier cases 
represent the predominant type of FHA disparate impact claim considered on 
appeal and the predominant type of claim among those on which plaintiffs 
have obtained positive outcomes.  Given the persistence of residential racial 
segregation and Congress’s purpose in enacting the FHA to eliminate such 
segregation, the disparate impact theory remains a vital tool for overcoming 
barriers to housing opportunity and should be upheld. 
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INTRODUCTION 
For forty years, the Fair Housing Act (FHA) has prohibited not 
only practices that are undertaken pursuant to a discriminatory 
motive, but also unjustified practices with discriminatory effects.1  
Every circuit court to decide the question, which includes all but the 
D.C. Circuit, has considered the broad purposes of the FHA and 
analogous interpretations of Title VII and determined that liability 
can be imposed under the FHA on a showing of discriminatory 
effects.2  The Supreme Court has never squarely addressed the 
question but after repeatedly denying certiorari in the earliest 
appellate cases to apply a disparate impact standard, it issued a per 
curiam affirmance of an appellate finding of disparate impact in an 
FHA case.3  The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD) issued a final rule in 2013 establishing uniform 
standards for evaluating FHA effects claims.4  Prior to the 
promulgation of its regulation, HUD, like the courts, had long 
interpreted the FHA to prohibit discriminatory effects, even in the 
absence of any evidence of discriminatory intent.5 
Despite the well-settled nature of the jurisprudence and HUD’s 
regulatory interpretation, the Supreme Court recently decided to 
review the disparate impact standard as a method of proof under the 
FHA.6  After the Supreme Court granted certiorari in 2011 in an 
Eighth Circuit decision upholding the disparate impact claim on an 
unusual set of facts, the City of St. Paul, the petitioner in the case, 
decided to withdraw its petition, thus preventing Supreme Court 
review.7  However, in 2012, the township of Mount Holly, New Jersey 
                                                          
 1. See ROBERT G. SCHWEMM & SARA K. PRATT, NAT’L FAIR HOUSING ALLIANCE, 
DISPARATE IMPACT UNDER THE FAIR HOUSING ACT:  A PROPOSED APPROACH 3 (2009), 
available at http://www.nationalfairhousing.org/Portals/33/DISPARATE%20IMPACT 
%20ANALYSIS%20FINAL.pdf (“Four decades of . . . litigation has produced a strong 
consensus that the Act does include an impact standard.”). 
 2. See id. at 6–7 (citing cases from each circuit). 
 3. See Town of Huntington v. Huntington Branch, NAACP, 488 U.S. 15, 18 
(1988) (per curiam) (refusing to reach the question of the appropriateness of the 
disparate impact test). 
 4. Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 
78 Fed. Reg. 11,460, 11,463 (Feb. 15, 2013) (codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 100). 
 5. Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects 
Standard, 76 Fed. Reg. 70,921, 70,921 (proposed Nov. 16, 2011) (to be codified 
at 24 C.F.R. pt. 100). 
 6. Twp. of Mount Holly v. Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 
2824 (2013) (granting petition for writ of certiorari to the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit), cert. dismissed, No. 11-1507, 2013 WL 6050174 (Nov. 15, 2013); 
Magner v. Gallagher, 132 S. Ct. 548 (2011) (granting petition for writ of certiorari to 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit). 
 7. Magner, 132 S. Ct. 1306 (2012) (dismissing certiorari pursuant to Rule 46.1 of 
the Rules of the Supreme Court). 
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subsequently filed a similar petition for certiorari in a separate case, 
which provided the Court with another opportunity to review the 
theory.8  The Court granted the petition in the summer of 2013,9 but 
that case also resolved prior to oral argument, again preventing 
Supreme Court review.10 
Why would the Court intervene to assess disparate impact theory in 
housing cases after allowing the theory to rest undisturbed for so 
many decades?  Is it possible to trace the evolution of the theory from 
its first appearance in housing jurisprudence to determine whether 
the theory has strayed from its original function?  Is the theory still 
necessary and important in accomplishing the congressional purpose 
of the FHA, which, beyond the overarching nondiscrimination goal 
“to provide, within constitutional limitations, for fair housing 
throughout the United States,”11 also includes the integration goal of 
replacing segregated neighborhoods with “truly integrated and 
balanced living patterns”?12 
In exploring the possible causes of the Court’s recent scrutiny of 
disparate impact theory in housing cases, this Article examines two 
types of housing regulation.13  One type of regulation may be 
described as “housing barrier” regulation.  The earliest disparate 
impact cases brought under the FHA challenged this type of 
regulation.14  A housing barrier regulation may operate in one of 
                                                          
 8. Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc. v. Twp. of Mount Holly, 658 F.3d 
375 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 2824 (2013), and cert. dismissed, 2013 WL 
6050174 (November 15, 2013). 
 9. Mount Holly, 133 S. Ct. 2824 (2013) (granting petition for writ of certiorari to 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit). 
 10. Mount Holly, 2013 WL 6050174 (Nov. 15, 2013)(dismissing certiorari 
pursuant to Rule 46.1 of the Rules of the Supreme Court). 
 11. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (2012). 
 12. Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 211 (1972) (quoting 114 
CONG. REC. 3422 (1968) (statement of Sen. Walter Mondale)).  Courts are sometimes 
“faced with a conflict between the goal of integration and the goal of expanding 
minority housing opportunities,” such as in the context of tenant selection policies 
designed to maintain integration by limiting the number of housing units for 
minority group members.  ROBERT G. SCHWEMM, HOUSING DISCRIMINATION LAW AND 
LITIGATION § 7.3 (2013 ed.).  Congress did not consider the conflict because it 
“believed that integration and nondiscrimination were complementary goals.”  Id. 
(citing United States v. Starrett City Assoc., 840 F.2d 1096 (2d. Cir. 1988)). 
 13. For a description of other types of housing regulation and practices that are 
subject to challenge using disparate impact theory, see infra Parts III.B, and 
Appendix B.  For example, several industry trade groups representing homeowners’ 
insurers recently filed a federal complaint seeking to block enforcement of HUD’s 
disparate impact rule against their members.  American Ins. Ass’n v. HUD, No. 1:13-
cv-00966 (D.D.C. filed June 26, 2013). 
 14. See, e.g., Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 149 (3d Cir. 1977) 
(affirming finding of racial impact in termination of a public housing project by city 
agencies following the urban renewal clearance of black families and creation of all-
white community); Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 
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several respects:  to prevent the construction of housing that will 
likely be used by minority groups in places that currently lack 
minority residents; to confine housing that will be used by minority 
group members to neighborhoods where minority households 
already predominate; or to otherwise deny minority households 
freedom of movement in a wider housing marketplace.15  In short, 
housing barrier regulations frequently perpetuate racial segregation.  
The other type of regulation, which has recently captured the Court’s 
attention, may be called “housing improvement” regulation.  This is a 
regulation or plan purportedly designed to improve the condition of 
housing and/or the surrounding neighborhood, typically through 
some combination of demolition and replacement of housing units, 
but also through other means such as the imposition of minimum 
housing standards or revitalization plans.16  The challenges to such a 
regulation typically center on the involuntary displacement of 
residents from their homes, with such displacement 
disproportionately affecting minorities.17 
The remedy sought is a key distinction between the disparate 
impact challenges to these two types of regulation.  The remedy for a 
successful disparate impact challenge to a housing barrier regulation 
is the removal of the housing barrier and the creation of housing 
opportunities where they might not have previously existed, whereas 
the remedy for a disparate impact challenge to a housing 
improvement regulation is usually preventing displacement from 
housing opportunities where they already exist.  If successful, a 
disparate impact challenge to a housing barrier regulation will almost 
always further both the nondiscrimination and the integration 
purposes of the FHA.18  A disparate impact challenge to a housing 
improvement regulation may or may not further the twin purposes of 
                                                          
1283, 1285, 1294 (7th Cir. 1977) (ruling that the Village of Arlington Heights’s 
refusal to relax a zoning ordinance requiring single family homes would violate the 
FHA if it would effectively prevent the construction of low-cost housing anywhere 
within the confines of the municipality); United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 
1179, 1183, 1188 (8th Cir. 1974) (holding that a zoning ordinance barring the 
construction of new multi-family housing units in a predominantly white area 
violated the FHA). 
 15. See infra Part I (assessing early FHA disparate impact challenges to housing 
barrier regulations). 
 16. See infra Part II (analyzing disparate impact challenges to housing 
improvement regulations). 
 17. See infra Part II (discussing zoning ordinances that displaced residents through 
condemnations, demolitions, and redevelopment plans, among other methods).  
 18. See SCHWEMM, supra note 12, § 7.3 (“[I]n exclusionary zoning cases . . . the 
conclusion that Title VIII is designed to promote integration has generally led courts 
to an expansive interpretation of the statute that advances the housing opportunities 
of minorities.”). 
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the FHA, as more fully described below.19  Accordingly, disparate 
impact challenges to housing improvement regulations must be 
analyzed with particular care to ensure that the FHA’s purposes of 
expanded housing opportunity and integration are furthered by such 
challenges.  This Article concludes that this careful analysis can be 
accomplished consistent with the proof standards articulated in 
HUD’s regulation. 
Given the persistence of residential racial segregation and 
Congress’s purpose in enacting the FHA to eliminate such 
segregation, the disparate impact theory remains a relevant, if 
misunderstood, tool for accomplishing Congress’s purpose.  
Consequently, the disparate impact theory should be upheld. 
Part I of this Article considers the earliest applications of the 
disparate impact theory in FHA cases, which involve challenges to 
housing barrier regulations.  It then considers more recent 
applications of the theory challenging barrier regulations and argues 
that the theory remains relevant and effective in removing barriers to 
housing opportunity and mobility, thereby curbing the perpetuation 
of segregation. 
In Part II, this Article explores two recent cases that illustrate the 
vulnerability of the disparate impact theory when used to challenge 
housing improvement regulations.  In both cases, the circuit courts 
reversed summary judgment granted by the district courts and 
reinstated the disparate impact claims.  Defendant-appellees in both 
cases petitioned for Supreme Court review, with the Court granting 
certiorari in each (with both cases dismissed by the petitioner shortly 
before oral argument).  These recent successes for plaintiff-
appellants in the housing improvement context have given the 
Supreme Court an opening to attack the theory when it would appear 
to stymie local government efforts to counteract neighborhood 
blight.  What is misleading about the two recent summary judgment 
reversals is that they mask an overwhelmingly unsuccessful track 
record for plaintiffs challenging housing improvement regulations 
and plans using FHA disparate impact theory.  This Article conducts 
a qualitative review of the cases and finds only one other success in 
this context for plaintiffs at the appellate level, consisting of an 
affirmance of a trial court ruling for plaintiffs with a remand to 
determine whether plaintiffs’ requested relief (re-occupancy) would 
actually further the purposes of the FHA.20 
                                                          
 19. See infra Part IV. 
 20. Charleston Hous. Auth. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 419 F.3d 729 (8th Cir. 2005). 
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Part III of this Article reports a quantitative analysis of forty years of 
FHA disparate impact appellate jurisprudence and finds that the 
courts have had little difficulty disposing of all manner of disparate 
impact claims under the FHA.  Plaintiffs have received positive 
decisions in only 20%, or eighteen of the ninety-two FHA disparate 
impact claims considered on appeal.  Although defendants were able 
to have 83.8% of their positive FHA disparate impact outcomes 
affirmed on appeal, plaintiffs were able to hold onto only 33.3% of 
their positive outcomes.  Plaintiffs have been able to reverse only four 
summary judgments in forty years, including the two recent reversals 
granted review by the Court.  These data also reveal that, at the 
appellate level, the predominant type of FHA disparate impact claim, 
and the predominant type of claim on which plaintiffs are receiving 
positive outcomes, is the housing barrier claim.  Comparing 
plaintiffs’ outcomes in housing barrier and housing improvement 
cases, plaintiffs succeeded twice as often in housing barrier cases 
(42%) than in housing improvement cases (21%).  These findings 
are illustrated in more detail in Figures 1 through 9. 
Part IV reviews the standards recently proposed by HUD for 
analyzing FHA disparate impact claims and considers whether they 
might be applied to housing improvement regulations in a way that 
furthers the nondiscrimination and integration purposes of the 
statute.  The FHA is concerned with opportunity, not maintaining the 
status quo of substandard, segregated housing.  If the challenged 
plan, which must be supported by evidence, revitalizes housing while 
setting the stage for exclusion and increased segregation, then it will 
be difficult to justify as legitimate and nondiscriminatory.  On the 
other hand, if the plan revitalizes housing while creating opportunity 
and integration, then plaintiffs will be hard-pressed to identify a less 
discriminatory alternative.  If history is any judge, most housing 
improvement challenges would continue to be decided on summary 
judgment.  However, summary judgment will not always be an 
appropriate vehicle for resolving these challenges.  Community and 
neighborhood revitalization plans will almost always be legitimate in 
the abstract but whether they are racially exclusionary will depend on 
the facts of a particular case. 
Part V briefly considers whether the FHA disparate impact theory is 
likely to survive Supreme Court review, assuming that the Court 
continues to grant certiorari on the issue.  Although it leaves the 
briefing of the statutory construction issue to the litigants, this Article 
observes that the earliest appellate courts to review the theory 
engaged in a statutory construction analysis.  They interpreted the 
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FHA consistent with the Supreme Court’s interpretation of Title VII, 
which recognized a discriminatory effects method of proof.  Given 
that Congress did not simultaneously consider the FHA when it 
amended Title VII to include the disparate impact standard, it is odd 
that the Court would jettison the disparate impact theory without 
questioning any of the other proof methods borrowed from Title VII, 
such as that created by the Court for disparate treatment cases in 
McDonnell Douglas.  Of perhaps most relevance, the Court recently 
recognized the disparate impact method of proof in age 
discrimination cases with Justice Scalia casting the deciding vote on 
the basis of his deference to the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC).21 
Part VI of this Article addresses whether the FHA disparate impact 
theory should survive, given its limited success and potential for 
perverse outcomes in housing improvement cases.  This Article 
concludes that the most perverse consequence of all would be the 
Court’s revocation of the disparate impact method of proof in all 
FHA cases, even those challenging housing barrier regulations.  
There is no need for panic over the use of disparate impact theory in 
the housing improvement context because these claims are fact-
intensive and can further the purposes of the FHA if improvement 
plans set the stage for exclusion.  The appellate courts have 
overwhelmingly controlled for perverse outcomes considering the 
forty-year history of the FHA.  This Article concludes that despite the 
limitations of disparate impact theory, it remains a vital tool for 
eliminating the segregation the FHA was enacted to combat. 
I. THE ROLE OF HOUSING BARRIER CASES IN EARLY FHA DISPARATE 
IMPACT CHALLENGES 
Litigants have used the disparate impact theory over the years to 
challenge a variety of housing-related regulations, policies, practices, 
and decisions.22  For example, in addition to housing barrier and 
housing improvement challenges operating at the neighborhood or 
municipal level, litigants have used the disparate impact theory to 
challenge tenant assignment or rental policies operating at the level 
of a single landlord or apartment complex.23  Others litigants have 
                                                          
 21. Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 247 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 22. See infra Figure 7, Appendix B. 
 23. See infra Figure 7, Appendix B; see also Graoch Assocs. #33, L.P. v. 
Louisville/Jefferson Cnty. Metro Human Relations Comm’n, 508 F.3d 366, 369 (6th 
Cir. 2007) (affirming summary judgment dismissal of disparate impact claim 
challenging landlord withdrawal from section 8 program based on failure to establish 
prima facie case); Mountain Side Mobile Estates P’ship v. Sec’y of Hous. & Urban 
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used the theory to challenge home lending and insurance practices.24  
The authoritative decisions have recognized “two kinds of racially 
discriminatory effects which a facially neutral decision about housing 
can produce.”25  The first kind of impact occurs in the form of “a 
greater adverse impact on one racial group than on another.”26  The 
second is evaluated with respect to the impact on the community 
involved:  “if it perpetuates segregation and thereby prevents 
interracial association it will be considered invidious under the Fair 
Housing Act independently of the extent to which it produces a 
disparate effect on different racial groups.”27  These two kinds of 
effects may be present individually or in combination in both housing 
barrier and housing improvement cases.  Regardless, effects alone do 
not establish liability under the FHA.28  Housing improvement 
regulations tend to involve the first kind of impact challenge, whereas 
housing barrier regulations tend to implicate the second kind, 
though not always. 
The earliest FHA cases analyzing disparate impact theory involve 
challenges to housing barrier regulations and illustrate the 
continuing salience of disparate impact theory under the FHA.  For 
example, in United States v. City of Black Jack,29 decided in 1974, a non-
profit organization challenged an ordinance prohibiting the 
construction of any new multi-family dwellings in the virtually all-
white suburban city of Black Jack, Missouri.30  The nonprofit, the 
Inter Religious Center for Urban Affairs, had sought “to create 
alternative housing opportunities for persons of low and moderate 
income living in the ghetto areas of St. Louis” in the form of 108 
                                                          
Dev., 56 F.3d 1243, 1254, 1257 (10th Cir. 1995) (reversing, based on adequate 
showing of business necessity, HUD Secretary’s decision that found a three-person 
occupancy limit in a mobile home park created a disparate impact); Betsey v. Turtle 
Creek Assocs., 736 F.2d 983, 985 (4th Cir. 1984) (reversing bench trial decision 
against plaintiffs on disparate impact claim challenging building-wide evictions 
pursuant to new, all-adult rental policy, finding that plaintiffs established a prima 
facie case).   
 24. See, e.g., Estate of Davis v. Wells Fargo Bank, 633 F.3d 529, 539, 541 (7th Cir. 
2011) (affirming summary judgment for lack of evidence showing defendant’s 
conduct had a racially based disparate impact on borrowers); Simms v. First Gibraltar 
Bank, 83 F.3d 1546, 1555 (5th Cir. 1996) (reversing jury finding of disparate impact 
of bank’s refusal to issue a commitment letter to cooperative housing owners because 
claim cannot be based on “a single act or decision”). 
 25. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1290 
(7th Cir. 1977); see also Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 
F.2d 926, 937 (2d Cir.) (same), aff’d per curiam, 488 U.S. 15 (1988). 
 26. Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d at 1290. 
 27. Id.; see infra note 244-49 and accompanying text. 
 28. See infra note 94 and accompanying text. 
 29. 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974). 
 30. Id. at 1183. 
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units of two-story townhouses.31  The city of Black Jack was 
incorporated following public awareness of the planned housing 
development, whereupon the residents acquired the zoning power to 
restrict multi-family development.32  The district court had found 
that the virtually all-white population in the suburbs of St. Louis 
County had doubled and triggered a housing boom, whereas blacks 
were concentrated “in the city and in pockets in the county,” 
thereby confined disproportionately “in overcrowded or 
substandard accommodations.”33 
In reviewing the challenged housing barrier regulation, the Eighth 
Circuit analogized to Title VII protections against barriers to equal 
employment:  “[j]ust as Congress ‘requires the removal of artificial, 
arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers 
operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or other 
impermissible classification[,]’ such barriers must also give way in the 
field of housing.”34  Thus, the court was explicit in its treatment of the 
challenged regulation as a market barrier that restricted the housing 
choices of blacks.35  Such a barrier regulation, if shown to have a 
racial impact, would be antithetical to the twin purposes of the FHA.  
As the court noted, local discretion “must be curbed where the clear 
result of such discretion is the segregation of low-income [b]lacks 
from all [w]hite neighborhoods.”36  Regardless of whether such a 
barrier regulation was racially motivated or merely “artificial, 
arbitrary, and unnecessary,” the court found that “[e]ffect, and not 
motivation, is the touchstone.”37 
The rationale is similar to that used in employment cases.  Neutral 
regulations or practices with discriminatory effects can operate as the 
functional equivalent of intentional discrimination.38  In the 
particular factual context of City of Black Jack, a neutral zoning 
regulation prohibiting multi-family housing in an all-white suburb of 
St. Louis would have achieved the same effect as a facially 
discriminatory zoning ordinance.  The court found that “[t]he 
                                                          
 31. Id. at 1182. 
 32. Id. at 1182–83. 
 33. Id. at 1183. 
 34. Id. at 1184 (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Griggs v. Duke 
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971)). 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 37. Id. at 1184–85. 
 38. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 987 (1988) (“[T]he 
necessary premise of the disparate impact approach is that some employment 
practices, adopted without a deliberately discriminatory motive, may in operation be 
functionally equivalent to intentional discrimination.”). 
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ultimate effect of the ordinance was to foreclose 85 percent of the 
blacks living in the metropolitan area from obtaining housing in 
Black Jack, and to foreclose them at a time when 40 percent of them 
were living in substandard or overcrowded units.”39  As the Eighth 
Circuit stated:  “‘we now firmly recognize that the arbitrary quality of 
thoughtlessness can be as disastrous and unfair to private rights and 
the public interest as the perversity of a willful scheme.’”40 The 
Supreme Court denied certiorari in the case.41 
In another seminal disparate impact case brought under the FHA, 
Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights,42 
the Seventh Circuit in 1977 favorably reviewed a disparate impact 
challenge to a zoning barrier regulation.  A religious order 
contracted with a housing development corporation to create 190 
townhouse units of low-cost housing that were to be racially 
integrated.43  The developer petitioned for rezoning of the property 
(zoned for single-family detached homes) to allow for construction of 
multi-family units.44  After a winding procedural history in which the 
Supreme Court reversed the Seventh Circuit’s prior ruling that a 
racially disparate impact violated the Equal Protection Clause,45 the 
Seventh Circuit on remand decided that a racial impact could violate 
the FHA.46  The court noted that Arlington Heights remained almost 
totally white and a refusal to rezone the plaintiffs’ land for an 
integrated, multi-family development “had the effect of perpetuating 
segregation.”47  Analogizing to Title VII, and considering the broad 
purposes of Congress in enacting Title VIII, the court found that a 
violation of the FHA could be established without a showing of 
discriminatory intent.48  Applying a four-part balancing test,49 the 
                                                          
 39. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d at 1186. 
 40. Id. at 1185 (internal quotation marks omitted).  The Eighth Circuit notes in 
dicta that there was also evidence in the record to support a finding of discriminatory 
intent in the enactment of the housing barrier regulation.  However, the court 
decided to rest its holding on the disparate impact theory.  Id. at 1185 n.3. 
 41. United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 
422 U.S. 1042 (1975). 
 42. 558 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1977). 
 43. Id. at 1286. 
 44. Id. 
 45. See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 254–
55, 264–65 (1977) (holding that proof of intent is required to establish a violation of 
the Equal Protection Clause (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976))).  The 
Supreme Court also affirmed the lower courts’ ruling that the plaintiffs had not 
carried their burden of proving discriminatory purpose.  Id. at 270. 
 46. Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d at 1290.   
 47. Id. at 1288. 
 48. Id. at 1288–90. 
 49. The court considered the following: (1) the strength of plaintiff’s showing of 
discriminatory effect; (2) whether there was some showing of discriminatory intent; 
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court weighed in plaintiffs’ favor the fact that Arlington Heights was 
overwhelmingly segregated and plaintiffs merely sought to enjoin the 
defendant “from interfering with their plans to dedicate their [own] 
land to furthering the congressionally sanctioned goal of integrated 
housing.”50  The court considered it a close case, remanding to the 
district court the question whether the development could be built 
on other land that was already zoned for multi-family development.51  
But ultimately, the court held that it “must decide close cases in favor 
of integrated housing.”52  The Supreme Court denied certiorari in 
this second Seventh Circuit decision.53 
A third case demonstrating the prominent role of zoning barrier 
regulations in early disparate impact challenges brought under the 
FHA is Resident Advisory Board v. Rizzo,54 decided in 1977.  Prior to 
demolition in 1960, 46% of a five-block area designated for public 
housing in the Whitman Urban Renewal Area in South Philadelphia 
had been occupied by black families.55  After demolition of the site 
dedicated for public housing, the Redevelopment Authority of 
Philadelphia condemned several additional blocks of row houses in 
the area adjacent to the public housing site.56  New single-family 
residences were built in these adjacent areas and were occupied by 
white families.57  Government-funded urban renewal efforts, then, 
transformed the southeast Whitman neighborhood of Philadelphia 
from an integrated neighborhood to an all-white neighborhood.58 
The public housing rebuilding process that followed sparked 
considerable controversy.  After a ten-year planning period for the 
public housing site, in 1970, various city agencies (with the approval 
of the Mayor and City Council) selected a developer to construct 120 
detached townhouses.59  Following community opposition, which 
included “thirty women . . . gather[ing] around the bulldozer and 
backhoe, blocking the operations of the contractor, refusing to leave 
                                                          
(3) the defendant’s interest in taking its challenged action; and (4) whether the 
plaintiff sought to affirmatively compel the provision of housing or merely restrain 
the defendant from interfering with the provision of housing.  Id. at 1290. 
 50. Id. at 1293 (discussing the remedy sought by plaintiffs); see id. at 1291 & n.9 
(describing the continued racial segregation of Arlington Heights). 
 51. Id. at 1293–94.  
 52. Id. at 1294. 
 53. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978). 
 54. 564 F.2d 126 (3d Cir. 1977). 
 55. Id. at 131. 
 56. Id. at 132. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 133. 
 59. Id. 
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the property when so requested,” various city agencies withheld 
police assistance, blocked construction, and sought to cancel the 
project.60  A newly elected mayor campaigned on a platform of 
blocking public housing (which he equated with “[b]lack housing”) 
from being constructed in white neighborhoods in the city.61  State 
court litigation proceeded but was ineffective in resolving the 
controversy.62  A class of plaintiffs living in segregated neighborhoods 
in Philadelphia and eligible to reside in the project, as well as two 
organizational plaintiffs, filed a federal action in 1971.63  After over 
four years of “pretrial maneuvering”64 a fifty-seven day trial 
commenced in 1975, resulting in the entry of injunctions in 1976 
against the city and its agencies ordering them to “take all necessary 
steps” for construction of the project and to refrain from taking any 
action in interference with construction.65 
On appeal, the Third Circuit upheld the district court’s finding 
that the city had acted with discriminatory intent.66  As for the other 
city agencies, the Philadelphia Housing Authority and the 
Redevelopment Authority of Philadelphia, the court applied a 
disparate impact test and held that “in Title VIII cases, by analogy to 
Title VII cases, unrebutted proof of discriminatory effect alone may 
justify a federal equitable response.”67  The court upheld the district 
court’s finding that the agencies’ actions had a discriminatory impact, 
noting that their termination of the public housing project was 
undertaken “in connection with [other] urban renewal activities” that 
transformed an integrated community into one in which “virtually no 
black families were to be found.”68  The court also found that blacks 
made up “a substantial proportion of those who would be eligible to 
                                                          
 60. Id. at 134–37.  Despite the compatibility of the project with the surrounding 
neighborhood and the potential for the public housing tenants to become 
homeowners, the local neighborhood organization reversed course and withdrew its 
support for the project.  Id. at 134. 
 61. Id. at 136. 
 62. Id. at 135–36. 
 63. Id. at 137. 
 64. Id. at 136. 
 65. Id. at 138. 
 66. Id. at 144–45.  The court noted the city’s joining in the community’s racially 
motivated opposition, the (Democratic) mayor’s explicitly racial statements equating 
public housing with “‘[b]lack housing’” and his refusals to place such housing in 
white neighborhoods, and the city’s steps to terminate the project with knowledge of 
the racially discriminatory effect.  Id. at 142. 
 67. Id. at 146.  Further, the court explained that Congress in 1968 rejected an 
amendment to Title VIII that would have required proof of discriminatory intent.  Id. 
at 147 (citing 114 CONG. REC. 5221–22 (1968) (statement of Sen. Baker)). 
 68. Id. at 149. 
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reside” in the terminated project.69  Cancellation of the housing 
project “erased” an opportunity for blacks to leave highly segregated 
neighborhoods and “contributed to the maintenance of segregated 
housing in Philadelphia.”70  After determining that the city agencies 
offered no justifications for their actions to terminate the housing 
project, the court upheld the district court’s injunctions against 
these agencies.71  The Supreme Court denied certiorari in the 
case.72 
Housing barrier regulations continued to provide fertile ground 
for disparate impact challenges in subsequent decades.73  In the 
1980s, in Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington,74 plaintiffs 
challenged a zoning scheme that “restrict[ed] private construction of 
multi-family housing to a narrow urban renewal” zone where minority 
residents already resided, and a refusal to amend the zoning 
ordinance to allow private multi-family construction in a white 
neighborhood where virtually no minorities resided.75  Housing Help, 
Inc., one of the plaintiffs challenging the zoning scheme, proposed 
development of 162 units in a neighborhood that was 98% white for 
tenants expected to include significant numbers of minority group 
members.76  The Second Circuit found that plaintiffs easily met their 
prima facie burden because they were able to demonstrate, in 
addition to other elements, both a “disproportionate harm” to blacks 
and a “segregative impact on the entire community.”77  The court 
                                                          
 69. Id.  The court had previously noted that the waiting list for public housing in 
Philadelphia was composed primarily of racial minorities—95%.  Id. at 142. 
 70. Id. at 142. 
 71. Id. at 150.  When reading Rizzo, one cannot help but wonder whether the 
residents might have brought a disparate impact challenge to the urban renewal plan 
before they were displaced.  At the same time, would such a challenge have been 
premature?  Was the exclusion of low income housing by the white beneficiaries of 
the urban renewal plan foreseeable?  Was the segregative impact of the urban 
renewal plan in Rizzo inevitable? 
 72. Resident Advisory Board v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 
U.S. 908 (1978). 
 73. See, e.g., Smith v. Town of Clarkton, 682 F.2d 1055, 1058–59, 1065–66 (4th 
Cir. 1982) (upholding a district court ruling in favor of plaintiffs under the disparate 
impact theory where town officials withdrew from a multi-municipality housing 
authority, effectively blocking construction of fifty units of public housing that had 
been approved for a virtually all-white town). 
 74. 844 F.2d 926 (2d Cir.), aff’d per curiam, 488 U.S. 15 (1988). 
 75. Id. at 928. 
 76. Id. at 930–31. 
 77. Id. at 938.  The court found that, compared with whites, a greater percentage 
within the minority community was income-eligible for subsidized housing.  Id.  The 
court also noted that minorities were disproportionately represented on waiting lists 
for subsidized housing units and certificates.  Id.  In addition, the court found that 
the town’s zoning scheme and refusal to rezone “perpetuated segregation in the 
Town.”  Id. at 937–38. 
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found the justifications offered by the town “insubstantial.”78  The 
court then directed the district court to order the town to rezone the 
plaintiff’s proposed site to allow for multi-family development and 
remove the zoning barrier limiting private development of multi-
family housing to the urban renewal area.79  The Supreme Court 
affirmed that part of the judgment implicating its mandatory 
jurisdiction, that is, the invalidation of the zoning ordinance, 
“without endorsing the precise analysis” of the Second Circuit.80 
In the 1990s, in Jackson v. Okaloosa County,81 the Eleventh Circuit 
reversed the dismissal of an FHA disparate impact claim challenging 
a policy that imposed special approval requirements for any public 
housing project sited in an unincorporated five-mile area of the 
county.82  A public housing applicant and a resident had challenged 
the policy as excluding public housing from a predominantly white 
area and concentrating that housing in one predominantly African-
American neighborhood; the plaintiffs alleged disparate impact on 
African-Americans because they comprised 86% of the public 
housing waiting list.83  The Eleventh Circuit held that the “action 
should not have been dismissed on the pleadings.”84 
A more recent, vivid example of the use of disparate impact theory 
to challenge housing barrier regulations involves the post-Katrina 
zoning activity of St. Bernard Parish, a suburban parish of New 
Orleans that experienced total devastation following Hurricane 
Katrina.85  Following the storm in 2005, St. Bernard Parish established 
a variety of restrictions on multi-family housing development and 
single-family rentals, including a measure restricting the rental of 
single-family residences to blood relatives.86  Given the racial 
                                                          
 78. Id. at 940. 
 79. Id. at 942. 
 80. See Huntington Branch, 488 U.S. at 18 (“[W]e note jurisdiction, but limit our 
review to that portion of the case implicating our mandatory jurisdiction.  Thus, we 
expressly decline to review the judgment of the Court of Appeals insofar as it relates 
to the refusal to rezone the project site.”). 
 81. 21 F.3d 1531 (11th Cir. 1994). 
 82. Id. at 1534–35. 
 83. Id. at 1542–43. 
 84. Id. at 1544. 
 85. See Stacy E. Seicshnaydre, How Government Housing Perpetuates Racial 
Segregation:  Lessons from Post-Katrina New Orleans, 60 CATH. U. L. REV. 661, 696–702 
(2011) (describing the restrictive measures taken by St. Bernard Parish to 
circumscribe its repopulation and redevelopment in the wake of Hurricane Katrina 
and the subsequent legal challenges to such measures). 
 86. St. Bernard Parish, La., Ordinance SBPC #670-09-06 § I(A) (Sept. 19, 2006) 
(prohibiting the rental of single-family residences “by any person or group of 
persons, other than a family member(s) related by blood within the first, second or 
third direct ascending or descending generation(s), without first obtaining a 
Permissive Use Permit from the St. Bernard Parish Council”); St. Bernard Parish, La., 
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composition of the parish, which as of 2000 was 88.3% white and 
7.6% black, and given the fact that white families owned 93% of all 
owner-occupied houses in the parish, a single-family property owner 
and a fair housing organization challenged the regulations, alleging 
discriminatory intent and effect.87 
With respect to the impact claim, the fair housing center argued 
that the regulatory scheme in St. Bernard Parish made rental housing 
unavailable to those who disproportionately needed that housing in 
the New Orleans metropolitan area—blacks and Hispanics.88  The 
plaintiffs also argued that the scheme “perpetuate[d] segregation by 
preserving the Parish as an overwhelmingly all-white enclave.”89  
Although the parties resolved the claims through a consent decree, 
St. Bernard Parish subsequently enacted another moratorium on 
multi-family housing developments consisting of five or more units.90  
This prompted additional litigation by the fair housing center and a 
developer seeking to build four mixed-income complexes of seventy-
two units each.91  The developer anticipated that 50% of the residents 
of the development would be black and that another 25% would be 
comprised of other minority groups.92  The district court ruled in 
favor of plaintiffs on both the intent and impact claims, finding 
violations of the parties’ consent order and the Fair Housing Act.93 
                                                          
Ordinance SBPC #632-11-05 (Nov. 1, 2005) (establishing “a moratorium on the re-
establishment and development of any multi-family dwellings in St. Bernard Parish 
throughout the disaster recovery period”). 
 87. See Affidavit of Dr. Calvin P. Bradford at 5–6, Greater New Orleans Fair Hous. 
Action Ctr. v. St. Bernard Parish, 641 F. Supp. 2d 563 (E.D. La. 2009) (No. 06-07185) 
(establishing the racial composition and home ownership patterns of the parish 
through the affidavit of a housing development expert); see also Amended Complaint 
for Injunctive Relief, Declaratory Judgment, and Remedial Relief at 2, id. (No. 06-
07185) (alleging discriminatory intent and effect). 
 88. Amended Complaint, supra note 87, at 2–3. 
 89. Id. at 2. 
 90. Consent Order at 5–8, 11, Greater New Orleans Fair Hous. Action Ctr., 641 F. 
Supp. 2d 563 (E.D. La. 2009) (No. 06-07185); St. Bernard Parish, La., Ordinance 
SBPC #905-09-08 (Sept. 16, 2008). 
 91. Greater New Orleans Fair Hous. Action Ctr., 641 F. Supp. 2d at 566. 
 92. Id. at 568.  The court found that income-qualified African American 
households and families were at least 25%, and in some cases 86%, more likely to be 
affected by the multi-family moratorium than Caucasian households and families.  Id. 
at 577–78. 
 93. Id.  After the filing of at least five more motions for contempt, wherein the 
housing developer and fair housing center challenged a variety of overt and covert 
measures designed to block the development, and in light of the HUD’s threat to 
withhold other funding, construction on the development proceeded.  Seicshnaydre, 
supra note 85, at 700–02.  For additional description of the litigation challenging the 
post-Katrina zoning regulation enacted in St. Bernard Parish, see id. at 696–704.  The 
Defendants filed notices of appeal throughout the district court proceedings; the 
appeals are consolidated and pending in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.  
E.g., Greater New Orleans Fair Hous. Action Ctr. v. St. Bernard Parish, 641 F. Supp. 2d 
563 (E.D. La. 2009), appeal docketed, No. 09-30134 (5th Cir. Feb. 26, 2009).  
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Of course, the availability of the disparate impact theory in FHA 
cases has not always resulted in relief for plaintiffs.  As the Seventh 
Circuit noted in Arlington Heights, “we refuse to conclude that every 
action which produces discriminatory effects is illegal.  Such a per se 
rule would go beyond the intent of Congress and would lead courts 
into untenable results in specific cases.”94 
Plaintiffs bringing FHA disparate impact challenges to zoning 
barriers have sometimes failed at the prima facie stage because of 
thin proof of impact.95  In a 2007 FHA disparate impact challenge to 
a cost-increasing regulation, for example, the Tenth Circuit affirmed 
summary judgment based on the plaintiff’s insufficient showing that 
the cost-increasing building regulation had a disparate impact on a 
minority group because of that group’s lower income.96  Rather, the 
Tenth Circuit ruled, plaintiff needed to make a specific showing as to 
the amount of the increase, along with a showing “that this increase 
disparately impacts the ability of members of the protected group to 
buy a dwelling” as compared with non-protected group members.97 
Aside from offering thin proof of impact generally, some 
challenges to housing barriers have failed to demonstrate the 
existence of a discriminatory barrier in the first place.  In 2009 for 
example, in Artisan/American Corp. v. City of Alvin,98 developers sought 
to build two developments of thirty-six subsidized rental units in a city 
near Houston that was asserted to be 45% Hispanic and to contain 
most of the low-income housing in the county.99  The Fifth Circuit 
affirmed summary judgment dismissing the developer’s disparate 
impact challenge to a 300-foot separation requirement (between 
apartment projects and single-family residential dwellings) because 
the developer was unable to identify anyone affected by the denial of 
his permit or show that a shortage of affordable housing actually 
                                                          
 94. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1290 
(7th Cir. 1977). 
 95. See, e.g., White Oak Prop. Dev., LLC v. Washington Twp., 606 F.3d 842, 851 
(6th Cir. 2010) (affirming summary judgment and finding that the plaintiff 
“presented no evidence . . . about the possible impact the prohibition on multifamily 
dwellings would have on minority populations in the Township”); Greengael, LC v. 
Bd. of Supervisors of Culpeper Cnty., No. 07-CV-00005, 2007 WL 2301570, at *3–4 
(W.D. Va. Aug. 7, 2007) (granting summary judgment and finding “there are no facts 
in the record which would indicate that the inability to construct multifamily homes 
in the M-2 zone will disproportionately harm minorities”), aff’d per curiam, 313 F. 
App’x. 577 (4th Cir. 2008).  
 96. See Reinhart v. Lincoln Cnty., 482 F.3d 1225, 1226, 1230–31 (10th Cir. 2007) 
(affirming summary judgment dismissing disparate impact claim challenging land 
use regulations for lack of proper prima facie proof). 
 97. Id. at 1230. 
 98. 588 F.3d 291 (5th Cir. 2009). 
 99. Id. at 294. 
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existed.100  The plaintiff certainly could not show that the denial of 
his permit to build subsidized housing furthered racial segregation, 
or that his proposed development would help further the integration 
purposes of the FHA.  To the contrary, the Fifth Circuit noted that 
additional low-income developments would actually further the 
concentration of racial minorities in the city.101 
Similarly, in Burrell v. City of Kankakee,102 the Seventh Circuit in 1987 
affirmed a trial judgment dismissing an FHA disparate impact 
challenge to a delay in processing section 8 Housing Assistance 
Payment contracts.103  In addition to finding a lack of evidence of 
discriminatory effect on availability of housing to minorities, the 
court found that the delays stemmed from concern about the undue 
concentration of assisted housing in the ward where plaintiff’s 
properties were located.104 
Thus, in the earliest FHA disparate impact cases and continuing 
into more recent decades, plaintiffs have used the theory to challenge 
barriers to the development of housing opportunities outside racially 
segregated neighborhoods.  Courts have nevertheless imposed 
rigorous prima facie proof requirements and have been less likely to 
impose liability in cases where the effect of plaintiff’s barrier 
challenge would be to increase segregation rather than eliminate it. 
II. DISPARATE IMPACT CHALLENGES TO HOUSING IMPROVEMENT 
REGULATIONS 
Although the precise proof standards governing FHA disparate 
impact challenges have varied,105 there is no disagreement among the 
circuits as to the theory’s validity.106  The quiet, if muddled, landscape 
on which the disparate impact theory has rested since shortly after 
the passage of the FHA was disrupted by the Supreme Court’s 
                                                          
 100. See id. at 295, 298–99 (noting that the concentration of low-income housing 
in the city “suggest[s] that there is no shortage” (alteration in original)). 
 101. Id. at 299 n.20; see also Hallmark Developers, Inc. v. Fulton Cnty., 466 F.3d 
1276, 1285, 1287 (11th Cir. 2006) (affirming post-trial judgment dismissing FHA 
disparate impact challenge to refusal to rezone property for low income housing, 
noting testimony that there was adequate housing for low and moderate income 
residents and the property was located in an area already predominately populated 
by minorities). 
 102. 815 F.2d 1127 (7th Cir. 1987). 
 103. Id. at 1130. 
 104. Id. at 1130–31. 
 105. See SCHWEMM & PRATT, supra note 1, at 21–26; see also id. at 21 (noting that 
“few appellate decisions have carefully examined the burden of justification in a FHA 
impact case, and these decisions reflect, accurately, that some issues have not been 
authoritatively resolved”).  But see infra Part IV (discussing HUD’s final rule setting 
forth uniform standards for evaluating FHA disparate impact claims). 
 106. Supra notes 1–5 and accompanying text. 
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decision in 2011 to grant certiorari in Magner v. Gallagher.107  In 
Magner, the Eighth Circuit did not consider the more prevalent FHA 
challenge to a housing barrier regulation, but rather reviewed 
enforcement of a housing improvement regulation.108  In contrast to 
the earlier discussion involving challenges to housing barrier 
regulations, this section will begin with the most recent challenges to 
housing improvement regulations and then consider the historical 
treatment of these challenges by the lower courts. 
A. Magner v. Gallagher 
In Magner, the plaintiff owners (or former owners) of rental 
property in St. Paul, Minnesota challenged the city’s housing code 
enforcement scheme, which had been on the books since 1993, but 
which the city began to enforce with vigor in 2002.109  The city 
targeted rental properties for its enforcement efforts.110  The plaintiff 
property owners rented primarily to low-income, rent-assisted 
households, of which blacks made up a disproportionate 
percentage.111  The property owners complained that the city’s 
aggressive code enforcement tactics increased their costs of doing 
business in the form of higher maintenance costs and fees.112  They 
also claimed that the city’s enforcement efforts resulted in making 
their properties unavailable through condemnations and forced 
sales.113  The court listed the particular code violations that the city 
cited against the plaintiffs, which included “rodent infestation, 
missing dead-bolt locks, inadequate sanitation facilities, inadequate 
heat, inoperable smoke detectors, broken or missing doors and 
screens, and broken or missing guardrails or handrails.”114  The 
plaintiffs did not challenge the city’s code standards as frivolous or 
unnecessary.  They instead argued that the city’s requirement that 
they bring their substandard housing into compliance increased their 
                                                          
 107. 132 S. Ct. 548 (2011) (granting petition for writ of certiorari to the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit). 
 108. See infra notes 116–118 and accompanying text (describing the appellants’ 
claim in Magner that the city’s enforcement of its housing code had a discriminatory 
impact on the appellants’ tenants). 
 109. Gallagher v. Magner, 619 F.3d 823, 828–29 (8th Cir. 2010). 
 110. Id. at 829. 
 111. Id. at 830. The district court noted plaintiffs’ claim that between 60% and 
70% of their tenant base was black.  See Steinhauser v. City of St. Paul, 595 F. Supp. 
2d 987, 995 (D. Minn. 2008) (reporting tenant demographics). 
 112. Magner, 619 F.3d at 830. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
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costs, which resulted in a decrease in the amount of affordable 
housing in the city.115 
Significantly, St. Paul did not enact a housing ban against rental 
properties or even target rental properties for demolition but rather 
targeted rental properties for improvement.116  In arguing that the 
housing improvement regulation made housing unavailable, the 
property owners required the court to make an additional inferential 
step between the regulation and the asserted impact.117  The court 
concedes that the claim is indirect:  the housing code enforcement 
“burdened [the] Appellants’ rental businesses, which indirectly 
burdened their tenants.”118  In deciding whether the plaintiffs 
satisfied their prima facie burden of impact, the court could have 
decided that the claim was too attenuated.  Indeed, neither the 
district court’s nor the Eighth Circuit’s opinion clarified whether the 
property owners actually demonstrated the effect of the minimal 
housing standards on their rental rates. 
The idea that a landlord must from time to time reinvest some of 
his or her rental proceeds for the purpose of property maintenance is 
hardly novel.119  The fact that a majority of the plaintiffs’ tenants 
received federal rental assistance suggests that the plaintiffs were not 
only guaranteed rental payments from the government, but were also 
receiving fair market rents as determined by HUD on an annual 
basis.120  Housing code compliance could simply reduce plaintiffs’ 
profit margin, rather than necessitate a rental increase.  Moreover, 
any rental increase caused by compliance with the housing code 
would not necessarily be unaffordable to all of plaintiffs’ tenants, nor 
                                                          
 115. See id. at 834–35 (discussing the property owners’ argument that the city 
experienced a shortage of affordable housing). 
 116. See id. at 829 (explaining the city’s goal of compelling property owners to take 
more responsibility for their buildings or forcing changes in ownership). 
 117. Id. at 835 (“Though there is not a single document that connects the dots of 
Appellants’ disparate impact claim, it is enough that each analytic step is reasonable 
and supported by evidence.”). 
 118. Id. 
 119. See CHRISTOPHER LEE, NAT’L APARTMENT ASSOC., EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: 2013 
SURVEY OF OPERATING INCOME & EXPENSES IN RENTAL APARTMENT COMMUNITIES 65, 
available at http://www.naahq.org/sites/default/files/naa-documents/income-expenses 
-survey/2013-Income-Expenses-Summary.pdf (discussing the increase of capital 
expenditures for rental property in 2012 reflecting that deferred maintenance and 
market competition required rental property upgrades).  
 120. Magner, 619 F.3d at 830; U.S. Housing Market Conditions Summary:  Fair Market 
Rents, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUSING & URB. DEV., http://www.huduser.org/periodicals/USHMC 
/winter98/summary-2.html (last visited Nov. 27, 2013) (“For the Section 8 program 
to work properly, certificate and voucher holders must have an adequate supply of 
decent, safe, and sanitary rental units to choose from.  Higher quality units 
command higher rents, so FMRs must be sufficiently high to provide acceptable 
choices for participants.”). 
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would it have to be permanent.  The plaintiffs did not appear to show 
that strict enforcement of the housing code raised their costs to such 
an extent that they could no longer rent their apartments at the 
rental rates established by the government for subsidized housing.121  
The court opinions do not indicate how many of the plaintiffs’ units 
were removed from the city’s affordable housing inventory, despite 
the plaintiffs’ allegations that some of the penalties included 
condemnations and revoked rental registrations.  Instead, the court 
accepted the argument that a cost-increasing regulation that burdens 
rental businesses (notwithstanding improving quality) resulted in a 
per se decrease in affordable housing.122 
The court suggested that there was more than one way to use 
statistics to show impact,123 and this is certainly true.  The notion that 
a policy that bars or reduces affordable housing may have a 
disproportionate effect on racial minorities is well established,124 but 
the plaintiffs presented thin proof that the city’s code enforcement 
regulation actually exacerbated an affordable housing shortage.125 
Especially troubling is the failure of the court to consider the 
implications of this aspect of its holding for the thousands of people 
who must regularly trade quality for affordability.  This is particularly 
true for poor black renters using HUD rental assistance who 
frequently live in worse or more segregated conditions compared 
                                                          
 121. See LEE, supra note 119, at 67 (“Economic losses tend to be lower in 
subsidized properties with their lower rents and relatively tight supply.”). 
 122. The court insists that it is requiring plaintiffs to demonstrate a causal link 
between the defendant’s neutral policy and the shortage of affordable housing, see 
Magner, 619 F.3d at 836 n.4, but this link is not apparent from the record.  The court 
merely maintains that the evidence shows that there was a shortage of affordable 
housing and that the City’s “aggressive code enforcement exacerbated that 
shortage.”  Id. at 836. 
 123. Id. at 837. 
 124. See, e.g., supra notes 81–84 and accompanying text (discussing housing barrier 
regulation that imposed special approval requirements for public housing 
construction in predominantly white area of county). 
 125. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party 
at 30, Magner v. Gallagher, 132 S. Ct. 1306 (2012) (No. 10-1032) (“[T]he court failed 
to identify evidence adequately supporting a finding that the challenged 
enforcement practices in fact caused any reduction in available affordable 
housing.”).  Plaintiffs attempted to link the city’s aggressive enforcement practices 
and the loss of affordable units by offering a Vacant Buildings Report, which showed 
an increase from 367 to 1466 in vacant homes over a nearly five year period.  Magner, 
619 F.3d at 835.  However, the district court noted that the report attributed the 
increase in vacant buildings to foreclosures stemming from other economic factors, 
not from code enforcement.  Steinhauser v. City of St. Paul, 595 F. Supp. 2d 987, 998 
(D. Minn. 2008). 
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with similarly situated whites using the assistance and compared with 
blacks not using any assistance at all.126 
There is no doubt that societal norms regarding minimal housing 
standards have changed and will continue to change.127  Although 
safe and sanitary features such as adequate heat, locks, handrails, 
smoke detectors, and the absence of rats might have once been 
considered luxuries, the City of St. Paul has determined that these 
features are now necessities.128  The idea that the business model of 
the subsidized plaintiff landlords precluded their provision of these 
features to the minority tenants who disproportionately rented from 
them is difficult to fathom.  The idea that the government is willing 
to subsidize property owners at fair market rates even when they fail 
to provide such basic features is even more galling.  Given the 
absence of any proof demonstrating that the government-established 
rents that most of the plaintiff landlords were receiving were not 
sufficient to pay for handrails and smoke detectors, the plaintiffs’ 
prima facie showing was lacking. 
Admittedly, the court noted that in many instances the city cited 
between ten and twenty-five violations per property and that some 
plaintiffs owned over forty properties.129  The cumulative nature of 
the violations, then, could have imposed significant expenditures that 
the plaintiffs could not make all at once.130  Yet, is the (federally 
subsidized) plaintiff landowner who maintains dozens of properties 
in substandard condition more aggrieved or simply more derelict?  In 
essence, the plaintiffs were operating under a more lenient 
enforcement regime, and then that regime changed.  However, the 
standards themselves do not appear to have changed.  This is the 
aspect of the plaintiffs’ claim that pushes the envelope.  In 
                                                          
 126. See Elizabeth Julian & Michael M. Daniel, HUD-Assisted Low-Income Housing:  Is 
It Working and for Whom?, POVERTY & RACE, July–Aug. 2009, at 3, 6–7 (analyzing a 
HUD study entitled Characteristics of HUD-Assisted Renters and Their Units in 2003, 
which used 2003 American Housing Survey data matched with HUD rental-assistance 
data and included demographic data for hundreds of units, projects and 
neighborhood conditions). 
 127. See City of St. Louis v. Brune, 515 S.W.2d 471, 476–77 (Mo. 1974) (en banc) 
(per curiam) (finding that the city ordinance requiring adjacent tub or shower 
facilities in each dwelling unit, thus forbidding units serviced by hall shower, was 
confiscatory as applied and violated the owner’s due process rights; enforcement of 
the ordinance did not implicate public health concerns, rather it “involve[d] a 
matter of inconvenience to those tenants who choose to pay a minimum rent in 
return for incomplete facilities”).   
 128. Magner, 619 F.3d at 830 (detailing plaintiffs’ code violations). 
 129. Id. 
 130. See Brune, 515 S.W.2d at 475–76 (citing cases discussing confiscatory 
nature of some housing code enforcement in relation to the market value of the 
affected properties).   
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challenging the City of St. Paul’s decision to enforce its housing code 
more strictly on the basis that it increased costs, the plaintiff 
landlords are essentially asserting—on behalf of their black tenants—
a right to live in substandard housing,131 which furthers neither the 
antidiscrimination nor the integration purposes of the FHA.  When 
viewed against the plaintiffs’ lack of proof that the city’s standards 
were unreasonable or were actually resulting in a demonstrable 
(rather than speculative) loss of affordable housing, this claim 
borders on the offensive.  The FHA was certainly not enacted to 
give an owner of a condemned unit, declared “unfit for 
habitation,”132 the right to continue renting the condemned unit 
to a desperate tenant.  Nor was the FHA enacted to give low-
income persons of color an “equal opportunity” to live in rat-
infested squalor.133 
However, there is another aspect to plaintiffs’ disparate impact 
claim that appears to drive the Eighth Circuit’s decision to reinstate 
it.  In addition to arguing that the city’s stricter enforcement 
increased their costs, which by itself fails to engender much 
sympathy, the plaintiff landlords challenged the city’s aggressive 
tactics.134  They complained that “the City issued false Housing Code 
violations and punished property owners without prior notification, 
invitations to cooperate with [the city], or adequate time to remedy 
Housing Code violations.”135  Plaintiffs essentially argued that the 
purpose and effect of the aggressive code enforcement tactics was to 
put them out of business rather than to achieve compliance with the 
code.  The plaintiffs’ suggestion that the city enforced the code with 
                                                          
 131. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON AND VICKI L. BEEN, LAND USE CONTROLS:  CASES AND 
MATERIALS 469 (3d. ed. 2005) (weighing the merits of housing code enforcement 
against housing affordability and the welfare of poor households).   
 132. Steinhauser v. City of St. Paul, 595 F. Supp. 2d 987, 992 (D. Minn. 2008). 
 133. See Amicus Brief of the United States, supra note 125, at 31 (“[A]ggressive 
enforcement of a housing code can lead to an increase in the availability of low-
income housing that meets minimal safety standards, thus potentially benefitting 
groups who are disproportionately represented in low-income housing.”). This case 
has a similar flavor to the use of the FHA disparate impact theory to challenge the 
closure of a group home following investigation of child abuse complaints.  See Omni 
Behavioral Health v. Miller, 285 F.3d 646, 655–56 (8th Cir. 2002).  No one wants to 
diminish group home options for children of color with special needs, but the FHA 
was not enacted to provide group home operators immunity from investigation 
because of the status of their residents.  And the FHA was certainly not enacted to 
facilitate the abuse of disabled children of color.  The Eighth Circuit affirmed 
summary judgment dismissing the FHA claim, which was a hybrid intent and effects 
claim.  Id.  Of course, evidence of targeted enforcement based on race and lack of 
probable cause might support a claim of disparate treatment. 
 134. Magner, 619 F.3d at 838 (“Appellants complain about how the City enforced 
the Housing Code-not just the code’s standards and requirements.”). 
 135. Id. at 834. 
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particular vigor against protected groups is essentially a disparate 
treatment claim, which may not have been adequately developed in 
the lower court and may have been mislabeled as a disparate impact 
claim.136  This claim has some support in the record based on 
statements demonstrating the city’s desire to reduce the number of 
low-income tenants living in the city.137 
Of particular importance, the Eighth Circuit did not rule for 
plaintiffs on the merits.  The court merely decided that the plaintiff 
landlords satisfied their prima facie burden.  The court remanded on 
the alternative district court ruling that plaintiffs did not, at the 
summary judgment stage, satisfy their final burden of offering “‘a 
viable alternative that satisfies the [City’s] legitimate policy objectives 
while reducing the . . . discriminatory impact’ of the City’s code 
enforcement practices.”138  The court found that a genuine issue of 
fact existed as to whether the city’s former code enforcement 
program was a viable alternative, given that it “generated a 
cooperative relationship with property owners, achieved greater code 
compliance, and resulted in less financial burdens on rental property 
owners,” which presumably then resulted in the maintenance of “a 
consistent supply of affordable housing.”139  Thus, the most generous 
reading of the plaintiffs’ allegations, which requires some parsing of 
the opinion, is that the city’s tactics, not increased costs, were 
preventing the plaintiff landlords from achieving compliance with 
the city’s housing code.  An alternative program focused on achieving 
compliance, rather than putting landlords out of business, they 
argue, would better accomplish the city’s legitimate objectives while 
reducing any discriminatory impact.140 
                                                          
 136. The district court found that much of the plaintiffs’ disparate impact 
argument in the briefs was centered on the city’s targeting of the landlords for 
enforcement on the basis of the race of their tenants.  Steinhauser, 595 F. Supp. 2d at 
997 n.5.  The court properly identified this as an intent claim and analyzed it as such.  
Id.  After concluding that plaintiffs did not assert a claim of intentional 
discrimination based on circumstantial evidence, the court considered the plaintiffs’ 
direct evidence of discrimination and found that it did not establish a claim of 
disparate treatment.  Id. at 1000, 1005–06.  The Eighth Circuit upheld the district 
court’s dismissal of plaintiffs’ disparate treatment claims.  Magner, 619 F.3d at 833.   
 137. Magner, 619 F.3d at 832. 
 138. Id. at 837 (alterations in original) (quoting Darst-Webbe Tenant Ass’n Bd. v. 
St. Louis Hous. Auth., 417 F.3d 898, 906 (8th Cir. 2005)).  
 139. Id. at 838.  At the district court level, the plaintiffs argued that the city could 
achieve its objectives by adopting the federal Housing Quality Standard (HQS), but 
the court found that plaintiffs did not meet their burden in support of this 
alternative or demonstrate that HQS would have a lesser impact on rents, low-income 
housing, or a protected class. See Steinhauser, 595 F. Supp. 2d at 999 (determining 
that adopting HQS would not be a less discriminatory alternative).   
 140. See Magner, 619 F.3d at 838 (characterizing the alternative program as 
successful at addressing and eliminating complaints against participating landlords). 
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Given that the Eighth Circuit’s decision still required the plaintiff 
landlords to prove their allegations at trial, it is curious that the 
Supreme Court decided to grant certiorari on a reversal of summary 
judgment.141  It is possible that the city would have prevailed after 
trial.  In any event, the city decided to withdraw the appeal following 
the completion of all briefing in the case and shortly before oral 
argument.142  Resolution of the impact standard under the FHA 
would have to wait for another day. 
B. Township of Mount Holly v. Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in 
Action, Inc. 
It was not long before the Court would be presented another 
opportunity to review the FHA disparate impact standard, again in 
the housing improvement context.  In June 2012, the Township of 
Mount Holly, New Jersey filed a petition for certiorari challenging the 
Third Circuit’s reversal of summary judgment on a disparate impact 
challenge to a housing improvement plan.143  The township sought to 
redevelop a thirty-acre neighborhood called “the Gardens,” which 
was the only predominantly minority neighborhood it had.144  After 
several iterations, the township’s redevelopment plan required the 
demolition of the existing 329 market rate homes that were 
affordable to its low and moderate income residents and replacement 
with 464 more expensive market-rate units and fifty-six affordable 
units.145  The existing units housed both renters and homeowners, 
and the structures were mostly two-story row houses of eight to 
ten units.146 
A residents’ association and twenty-three current and former 
residents challenged the redevelopment first in state court, which 
found no violations of state law and the anti-discrimination claims 
                                                          
 141. See infra Part II.D. (offering evidence that most cases concerning disparate 
impact challenges to housing improvement plans are dismissed before trial and that 
the summary judgment reversals in Magner and Mount Holly were anomalous). 
 142. Magner v. Gallagher, 132 S. Ct. 1306 (2012) (dismissing certiorari pursuant 
to Rule 46.1 of the Rules of the Supreme Court). 
 143. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1, Twp. of Mount Holly v. Mt. Holly Gardens 
Citizens in Action, Inc., No. 11-1507 (June 11, 2012) [hereinafter Mount Holly Cert. 
Petition].  The petition sought review of the decision in Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in 
Action, Inc. v. Township of Mount Holly, 658 F.3d 375, 377, 382 (3d Cir. 2011), which 
held that the plaintiffs’ statistical submission demonstrating that the township’s 
redevelopment plan had a disparate impact on minorities should have survived 
summary judgment. 
 144. Mount Holly, 658 F.3d at 377. 
 145. Id. at 378–79.  
 146. Id. at 378. 
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unripe.147  The plaintiffs then filed in federal court alleging, among 
other things, that the redevelopment plan had a disparate impact on 
African American and Hispanic persons.148  The plaintiffs alleged that 
African Americans were eight times more likely to be affected by the 
redevelopment than were whites, and Hispanics were eleven times 
more likely to be affected.149  The parties particularly disputed who 
would be eligible to return to the development, with plaintiffs 
claiming 21% of African-American and Hispanic households in the 
county as eligible compared to 79% of whites.150  The district court 
considered the absolute number of African American and Hispanic 
residents in the county who could afford to return, which far 
exceeded the number of replacement units at the Gardens, rather 
than using proportional statistics to compare the impact of 
redevelopment on various groups.151 
The Third Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary 
judgment for the township.152  The court held that the district court 
erred in rejecting plaintiffs’ proportional statistical submissions, 
which it reasoned should have been reviewed in the light most 
favorable to them.153  The court acknowledged that the district court 
was grappling with a “valid and practical concern,” namely, the 
consequences of upholding a disparate impact challenge to a housing 
redevelopment plan, which could “render the Township powerless to 
rehabilitate its blighted neighborhoods.”154  The court recognized, 
however, that there was ample precedent to uphold the particular 
method the plaintiffs selected to meet their prima facie burden.155  
The court rejected the notion that perpetuation of segregation is the 
only method of proving impact,156 and the court seemed constrained 
to rule that a redevelopment plan targeted at the town’s only 
                                                          
 147. Id. at 380. 
 148. Id. at 380–82.  The plaintiffs also alleged that the redevelopment plan was 
undertaken with discriminatory intent, but the Third Circuit upheld the district 
court’s dismissal of that claim.  Id. at 387. 
 149. Id. at 382.  The plaintiffs argued, using 2000 census data, that 22.54% of all 
African-American residents and 32.31% of all Hispanic households in Mt. Holly 
would be affected by the demolitions, whereas only 2.73% of white households would 
be affected.  Id.   
 150. Id. at 382. 
 151. Id. at 383. 
 152. Id. at 377. 
 153. Id. at 382.  The Third Circuit also noted the district court’s error in requiring 
a showing that all minorities were treated differently than all whites, a showing 
applicable to disparate treatment cases, not disparate impact cases.  See id. at 383. 
 154. Id. at 385. 
 155. Id. at 382 (citing Keith v. Volpe, 858 F.2d 467, 484 (9th Cir. 1988); Huntington 
Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 929 (2d Cir. 1988)). 
 156. Id. at 385. 
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predominantly minority neighborhood was bound to have a 
disproportionate impact on them as a group.157  Rather than avoiding 
perverse results by straining to block plaintiffs’ prima facie case, the 
court found that the “inquiry must continue.”158 
Similar to Magner, no one disagreed that the township had a 
legitimate interest in alleviating blight.159  The battleground in Mount 
Holly, other than the prima facie showing of impact, was whether that 
interest could be achieved in a way that would not displace residents 
involuntarily from their homes and price them out of their 
neighborhood and indeed the town.160  Frequently in disparate 
impact cases challenging housing improvement plans, the battle is 
over whether and how units can be rehabilitated rather than 
demolished.161  Not surprisingly, the plaintiffs’ expert indicated that 
remediation did not require “wholesale destruction,” and suggested 
alternatives that included staged rehabilitation.162  Because the 
township offered evidence that rehabilitation was not economically 
feasible, the court found that a factual issue did exist as to whether 
the defendant had met its initial burden of showing that there were 
no less discriminatory alternatives to its redevelopment plan.163 
                                                          
 157. Id. at 382. 
 158. Id. at 385.  The court, having earlier accused the district court of conflating 
the disparate treatment and impact standards, followed suit in its discussion of the 
necessity of a “searching inquiry into the motives behind a contested policy to ensure 
that it is not improper.”  Id.  The court further explained that the prima facie case 
does not establish liability, but “simply results in a more searching inquiry into the 
defendant’s motivations—precisely the sort of inquiry required to ensure that the 
government does not deprive people of housing ‘because of race.’”  Id.  At the same 
time, the court noted that the “[e]ffect, not motivation, is the touchstone.”  Id.  It 
is possible that the court is concerned about the motivation behind the 
redevelopment plan and is allowing use of the disparate impact theory to 
“smok[e] out subtle or underlying forms of intentional discrimination.”  Id.  
(quoting Christine Jolls, Commentary, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115 
HARV. L. REV. 642, 652 (2001)). 
 159. Id. at 385.  
 160. See id. at 379 (describing resident fears of displacement and inability to 
afford a home in the Gardens or anywhere else in the town); see also id. at 383 
(noting that residents claimed even the affordable units would be out of reach 
for most Gardens residents).  
 161. See, e.g., Charleston Hous. Auth. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 419 F.3d 729, 734 
(8th Cir. 2005) (asserting that the housing authority’s plan to revitalize through 
demolition would create a disparate impact on racial minorities).  
 162. Mount Holly, 658 F.3d at 386–87.   
 163. Id. at 387.  The court articulated the township’s proof as requiring a showing 
that the alternatives proposed an undue hardship.  See id. at 386.  In HUD’s disparate 
impact regulation, promulgated after the Third Circuit’s decision in Mount Holly, 
plaintiffs, rather than defendants, will have the burden of proving that a less 
discriminatory alternative to the challenged practice exists that will serve the 
defendant’s interests.  See 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(c)(3) (2013) (indicating that a plaintiff 
may prevail even if the defendant meets his or her burden of proof if the plaintiff 
can demonstrate that the defendant’s legitimate interests can be served by a practice 
with less discriminatory effect).   
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Neither the Magner nor the Mount Holly circuit courts, therefore, in 
reversing the district court’s dismissal of plaintiffs’ disparate impact 
claims, entered a final judgment in favor of plaintiffs.  They simply 
allowed the cases to proceed to trial, finding that plaintiffs met 
their prima facie burden and created a fact issue on the question 
of whether there were less discriminatory alternatives to the 
defendants’ methods of improving housing conditions in the 
relevant communities.  
The Supreme Court granted Mount Holly’s petition for the 
purpose of deciding whether the disparate impact theory was 
cognizable under the FHA.164  Before oral argument, the case was 
resolved and the petition withdrawn.165   
C. Charleston Housing Authority v. U.S. Department of Agriculture 
In the only other successful FHA disparate impact challenge to a 
housing improvement plan found at the appellate level, the Eighth 
Circuit considered whether the demolition of housing predominantly 
occupied by minority groups constituted a violation of the FHA.  In 
2005, in Charleston Housing Authority v. U.S. Department of Agriculture,166 
the housing authority sought to revitalize through the demolition of a 
fifty-unit public housing development occupied almost entirely by 
African Americans.167  Current and former residents along with a 
non-profit organization challenged the demolition alleging a 
disparate impact based on race.168  In ruling for plaintiffs following 
trial, the district court found that the demolition plan did have a 
disparate impact in violation of the FHA, ultimately ordering the 
housing authority to reopen the apartment complex and give priority 
to former residents.169  The Eighth Circuit upheld the district court’s 
finding that plaintiffs satisfied their prima facie burden, whether 
based on the waiting list population, the income-eligible population, 
                                                          
 164. Twp. of Mount Holly v. Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 
2824 (2013) (granting petition for writ of certiorari to the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit), cert. dismissed, No. 11-1507, 2013 WL 6050174 (Nov. 15, 2013); 
Mount Holly Cert. Petition, supra note 143, at i. 
 165. Mount Holly, 2013 WL 6050174 (Nov. 15, 2013) (dismissing certiorari 
pursuant to Rule 46.1 of the Rules of the Supreme Court). 
 166. 419 F.3d 729 (8th Cir. 2005). 
 167. Id. at 733. 
 168. Id. at 734.  In an aspect of the case not relevant here, the housing authority 
filed a separate action against the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) that was 
consolidated with the fair housing case, in which it sought to remove statutory and 
contractual restrictions requiring it to operate the property as public housing.  Id. at 
733–34.  The USDA had helped finance the renovation of the property in 1981.  Id. 
at 733.   
 169. Id. at 736–37. 
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or the population of actual apartment tenants.170  The court 
considered the housing authority’s purported justification of 
reducing the concentration of low-income housing.  While noting 
that density reduction was a legitimate goal recognized by Congress, 
the Eighth Circuit upheld the district court’s factual finding that the 
housing authority failed to demonstrate the need for de-
concentration in the circumstances of the case.171  In a very 
significant final turn, however, the court refused to affirm the district 
court’s order requiring that the apartments be reopened for 
occupancy, and instead remanded to the district court for it to hold 
an evidentiary hearing on “current conditions at the apartments and 
evidence regarding proposals for redevelopment.”172  Despite holding 
that the demolition plan had a disparate impact on African-American 
tenants, the Eighth Circuit recognized that the passage of time might 
have “materially change[d] circumstances” so that an alternative to 
re-occupancy might “affirmatively further fair housing in a more 
positive fashion.”173  Thus, although the court’s opinion left the 
door open to possible re-occupancy, it is not clear that the 
plaintiff’s successful showing of disparate impact would block the 
demolition. 
Charleston Housing Authority demonstrates the need for a fact-
intensive inquiry in challenges to housing improvement regulations 
to ensure that the purposes of the FHA are furthered by the 
challenge.  Even though the circuit court agreed that the demolition 
plan would have a racially disparate impact, it was not willing to grant 
the relief the plaintiffs requested.  In cases challenging demolition of 
housing overwhelmingly occupied by minorities, prima facie proof of 
impact may be straightforward.174  The purported justifications based 
                                                          
 170. Id. at 741.  
 171. Id. at 742.  The district court had blended the burdens in its disparate impact 
analysis by characterizing the defendant housing authority’s justifications as 
“pretextual”—an analysis more appropriate in a disparate treatment case.  See id. at 
741 (reviewing the district court’s factual determinations on the Housing Authority’s 
justifications).  Such discussion of pretext is unnecessary because, if a defendant is 
unable to support its purported justifications with sufficient evidence, as the housing 
authority was in this case, then it will hardly be able to demonstrate a “manifest 
relationship” between the proposed action and the justification, or that the proposed 
action is “necessary” to achieve its objectives.  See id. at 741 (setting forth defendant’s 
disparate impact burden of proof in the Eighth Circuit). 
 172. Id. at 742–43. 
 173. Id. at 742. 
 174. But see Anderson v. Jackson, No. 06-3298, 2007 WL 458232, *1, *9 (E.D. La. 
Feb. 6, 2007) (explaining that proposed public housing demolition plans where 
100% of the population is African American do not per se create adverse 
impact.  The plaintiffs must provide supporting evidence that the plan caused a 
“statistical disparity between the African-American residents and non-protected 
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on the revitalization of blighted housing may also be straightforward.  
However, as more fully explored in Part IV, the circuit court 
understood that FHA disparate impact theory can and should be 
focused on whether a less discriminatory alternative to wholesale 
demolition is available that does not maintain the status quo of 
racially segregated, substandard housing.175 
What is misleading in the discussion of all three of these cases and 
what may be escaping the Supreme Court is that historically, plaintiffs 
have been terrifically unsuccessful at the appellate level in disparate 
impact challenges to housing improvement plans.  In fact, with the 
exceptions of Magner, Mount Holly, and Charleston Housing Authority, 
plaintiffs have failed in every other appeal involving an FHA disparate 
impact challenge to a housing improvement plan, as set forth in the 
next subsection. 
D. Unsuccessful Housing Improvement Cases at the Appellate Level 
The recent string of successes in the ability of FHA disparate 
impact plaintiffs to survive summary judgment or preserve post-trial 
judgments in challenges to housing improvement plans is not 
representative of the forty-year history of the FHA.176  More 
particularly, FHA disparate impact challenges to the enforcement of 
housing codes against property owners based on theories similar to 
those urged in Magner have been unsuccessful on appeal.  In 2009, in 
Bonasera v. City of Norcross,177 the Eleventh Circuit affirmed summary 
judgment dismissing an Hispanic homeowner’s disparate impact 
challenge to a city’s enforcement of a single-family zoning ordinance 
against her.178  The plaintiff alleged that the city selectively enforced 
its ordinance against her because she rented rooms to Hispanic 
persons in a white neighborhood.179  Although the plaintiff brought 
intent and effects claims, she appeared to conflate the theories in 
arguing that the city’s selective enforcement, which would by 
definition be influenced by some consideration of race or national 
                                                          
individuals” or “evidence to support their claim that the proposed demolition plans 
perpetuate segregation”). 
 175. See Charleston, 419 F.3d at 742 (directing the district court to consider 
“alternative proposals for revitalization . . . that will affirmatively further fair housing 
in a more positive fashion than reoccupancy of the existing apartments”). 
 176. See infra Part III (analyzing FHA disparate impact theory cases at the 
appellate level, showing that over the forty-year history, many more cases than 
not end negatively for plaintiffs). 
 177. 342 F. App’x 581 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam). 
 178. Id. at 586. 
 179. Id. at 583. 
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origin, had a disparate impact.180  Ultimately, the appellate court 
rejected both claims and found that the plaintiff presented no 
evidence that the enforcement of the ordinance had an impact on 
the city’s Hispanic population generally.181 
Other noteworthy cases illustrate the difficulty of challenging code 
enforcement schemes using disparate impact theory.  In 1999, in 
Catanzaro v. Weiden,182 a plaintiff challenged the decision of 
Middletown, New York to demolish two of his buildings (each 
containing eight low-income apartments) almost immediately 
following their damage in a car accident; plaintiff’s theory was that 
the city engaged in a “calculated campaign” to drive out minorities by 
making low-income housing units unavailable.183  On panel 
rehearing, the Second Circuit noted that the plaintiffs were 
challenging the demolition of two buildings, not the city’s overall 
housing policy.184  The court affirmed summary judgment for 
defendant and held the evidence insufficient to demonstrate that any 
housing policies had a discriminatory effect or that the demolitions 
were part of discriminatory housing policies.185  In 1994, in Armendariz 
v. Penman,186 the Ninth Circuit considered evidence that “a significant 
number of minorities were impacted” by code enforcement sweeps 
closing low-income housing units in the Arden-Guthrie 
neighborhood of the City of San Bernardino, but found the evidence 
insufficient to avoid summary judgment dismissal of the FHA claim.187  
Again, in arguing that the city’s decision to target a particular 
neighborhood for code enforcement sweeps had a disparate racial 
impact, plaintiffs failed to challenge the code enforcement scheme 
generally or provide any racial data for neighborhoods not selected 
for the sweeps.188 
                                                          
 180. See id. at 585–86 (explaining that the use of disparate impact evidence in a 
selective enforcement case might more appropriately be used to provide 
circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent). 
 181. Id. at 586. 
 182. 188 F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 183. Id. at 58–60. 
 184. Id. at 65. 
 185. Id.  
 186. 31 F.3d 860 (9th Cir. 1994) (granting summary judgment to defendants on 
plaintiffs’ FHA claim), aff’d in part, vacated in part en banc, 75 F.3d 1311 (9th Cir. 
1996) (upholding panel dismissal of FHA disparate impact claim).  The defendants 
in this case raised qualified immunity defenses that entitled them to an interlocutory 
appeal of the district court’s denial of summary judgment; the Ninth Circuit reversed 
the denial.  Id. at 863. 
 187. Id. at 868–69.  
 188. Id.  The court also noted the absence of any allegation of discriminatory 
intent in the targeting of the Arden-Guthrie neighborhood.  Id. at 869. 
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Another case challenging the targeting of neighborhoods for 
aggressive code enforcement illustrates the importance of developing 
a strong record of disparate treatment in such cases.  In 2006, in 2922 
Sherman Avenue Tenants’ Ass’n v. District of Columbia,189 several tenant 
groups challenged the targeting of Hispanic neighborhoods for 
housing code enforcement, which resulted in the closure of certain 
buildings.190  The D.C. Circuit set aside the jury verdict in favor of 
plaintiffs on the disparate impact claim, but remanded so that the 
jury could be instructed on the disparate treatment claim.191  The 
D.C. Circuit found that the plaintiffs did not present sufficient 
evidence of the national origin of the tenants actually residing in the 
properties targeted for aggressive code enforcement, which was 
necessary to show actual impact.192  However, the court found that the 
plaintiffs had made a sufficient record on the claim that the District 
of Columbia intentionally selected some buildings and excluded 
others on the basis of the national origin of neighborhood 
residents.193  The District’s initial “Hot Properties” list consisted of 
seventy-five buildings evenly distributed throughout the District, but 
their final list included twenty-seven buildings “located in 
neighborhoods with an average percentage of Hispanic residents 4.1 
times as great as the percentage of Hispanics in the city as a whole.”194  
This case demonstrates how the discriminatory effects of a code 
enforcement scheme can establish disparate treatment on a well-
developed record that includes other circumstantial evidence of 
neighborhood targeting. 
Thus, many of the disparate impact challenges to housing codes 
discussed in this Part, including that in Magner, demonstrate the 
danger of relying too heavily on disparate impact theory to do the 
work of what is essentially a disparate treatment claim.  These 
challenges centered not on the housing codes themselves, but on the 
targeting of the codes against certain neighborhoods and the 
enforcement of the codes against plaintiffs to achieve racially 
discriminatory objectives.  The more isolated and targeted the code 
enforcement action, the more appropriate a disparate treatment 
challenge.  However, a proper disparate impact claim can 
nevertheless be made, in addition or in the alternative, if the 
challenge is to a generalized plan of aggressive code enforcement 
                                                          
 189. 444 F.3d 673 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
 190. Id. at 676. 
 191. Id. at 676–77. 
 192. Id. at 680–81. 
 193. Id. at 684. 
 194. Id. at 682. 
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that is race-neutral, but has the effect of removing or displacing 
persons of color at a disproportionate rate from a certain 
neighborhood or jurisdiction. 
Plaintiffs bringing FHA disparate impact challenges to enjoin 
private landlords from displacing tenants in the course of housing 
rehabilitation activities have also met with limited success.  In 1989, in 
Gomez v. Chody,195 residents of a five-building apartment complex 
consisting of seventy-three units challenged the manner of their 
displacement from the apartments during rehabilitation.196  The 
residents, 95% of whom were Hispanic, alleged that 60% of the city’s 
Hispanic residents resided at the complex.197  The Seventh Circuit 
affirmed summary judgment, finding this evidence insufficient to 
establish liability given that the entire complex had been declared a 
public nuisance and unfit for human habitation, effectively displacing 
every resident of the building.198  Also important to the court was the 
fact that the rehabilitation plan “was designed to benefit persons of 
low to moderate income” and not “a device, intentional or otherwise, 
to force Hispanics out of Wood Dale.”199  Rather than demolishing 
the units, the plan would result in rehabilitating them, with 51% of 
the apartments occupied by low- or moderate-income persons; this 
could in theory allow displaced residents to return to the complex.200  
In a similar case decided in 2007, Bonvillian v. Lawler-Wood Housing, 
LLC,201 tenants challenged the closing of a single apartment building 
for renovation following Hurricane Katrina, arguing that a majority 
of the affected residents were disabled and members of minority 
groups.202  The Fifth Circuit affirmed summary judgment dismissing 
the disparate impact claim, finding that because the building was 
closed to all tenants, all were equally affected with no disparate 
impact on protected class members.203 
Plaintiffs seeking to enjoin housing authorities in their efforts to 
rehabilitate and revitalize public housing also have had considerable 
difficulty.  In 2005, for example, in Darst-Webbe Tenant Ass’n Board v. 
                                                          
 195. 867 F.2d 395 (7th Cir. 1989). 
 196. Id. at 397. 
 197. Id.  
 198. Id. at 397, 402.  The record revealed that “[t]he apartments were in an 
advanced state of dangerous disrepair, unsanitary, and infested with insects and 
rodents.”  Id. at 397. 
 199. Id. at 403. 
 200. Id. at 401. 
 201. 242 F. App’x 159 (5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam). 
 202. Id. at 160. 
 203. Id. 
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St. Louis Housing Authority,204 plaintiff tenant associations challenged 
public housing revitalization plans that sought to reduce the density 
of public housing units and replace them with a mix of subsidized 
and market rate rental and homeownership units.205  The plaintiffs 
argued that the housing authority should provide 120 more public 
housing units on or off site than were being planned.206  On review of 
a bench trial decision, the Eighth Circuit assumed that the plaintiffs 
established a prima facie case; the development was racially 
segregated, with 220 family public housing units occupied almost 
entirely by African Americans.207  After finding the housing 
authority’s objectives of de-concentration to be legitimate and facially 
neutral, however, the court found that the plaintiff offered no 
evidence that its alternative housing mix could accomplish 
defendants’ objectives with less discriminatory effect.208 
A qualitative examination of FHA disparate impact challenges to 
housing improvement plans and regulations at the appellate level 
therefore reveals that these claims are frequently dismissed before 
trial, the dismissals are upheld, plaintiffs face difficulty on the claims 
in the rare trials that do occur, and appellate courts have no trouble 
affirming the plaintiffs’ trial defeats and reversing their trial wins.209  
The summary judgment reversals for plaintiffs in Magner and Mount 
                                                          
 204. 417 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 2005). 
 205. Id. at 900. 
 206. Id. at 901. 
 207. Id. at 900, 902.  Other courts have refused to find a prima facie case in a 
challenge made to the demolition of public housing where virtually all of the 
residents displaced by a revitalization plan are African American.  See, e.g., Anderson 
v. Jackson, No. 06-3298, 2007 WL 458232, at *1, *9 (E.D. La. 2007) (finding prima 
facie evidence insufficient where plaintiffs failed to show that the proposed 
demolition of four of New Orleans’ largest public housing developments following 
Hurricane Katrina caused a statistical disparity between the residents who were 
virtually all African American and any non-protected individuals). 
 208. Darst-Webbe, 417 F.3d at 903, 906; see also id. at 904 (“We . . . do not sit as a 
secondary legislative body to amend or rework funding and planning decisions based 
on our own, alternative predictive judgments about the likely success of alternative 
proposed actions.”).   
 209. Of course, this analysis does not capture the cases that are resolved through 
settlement, cases which may present the strongest prima facie showing of impact.  
For example, in Hispanics United of DuPage County v. Village of Addison, the district 
court recounted the parties’ disparate impact arguments in conducting a fairness 
hearing on a negotiated consent decree in a case challenging a redevelopment plan.  
988 F. Supp. 1130 (N.D. Ill. 1997).  The court noted the strength of the plaintiffs’ 
showing of impact:  
Over 49% of the TIF district residents are Hispanic, while their Village-wide 
population is just 13.4%.  The districts also contain the two largest Hispanic 
neighborhoods—in fact the only two majority Hispanic areas—in the Village.  
Moreover, almost 44% of the Village’s entire Hispanic population resides in 
these two districts. 
Id. at 1155. 
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Holly, while apparently sufficient to capture the attention of the high 
Court, are aberrational. 
A quantitative analysis of how FHA disparate impact claims have 
fared over their forty-year history is offered next to shed additional 
light on how the appellate courts have struck the balance in disparate 
impact cases generally, and in housing barrier and housing 
improvement cases specifically. 
III. A QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF FORTY YEARS OF FHA DISPARATE 
IMPACT CASES AT THE APPELLATE LEVEL 
Over the past forty years, courts have had ample opportunity to 
define the limits of the disparate impact theory in the context of the 
FHA.  For purposes of this section, the analysis includes all of the 
disparate impact claims brought under the Fair Housing Act210 and 
actually considered by an appellate court211 in the more than forty 
years212 since the disparate impact standard was recognized for Title 
VII by the Supreme Court in 1971.213  After eliminating those cases 
where the appellate court did not reach the disparate impact claim 
on procedural grounds,214 or because the case was essentially decided 
on disparate treatment grounds,215 ninety-two pertinent cases remain 
                                                          
 210. This Article does not consider disparate impact claims challenging 
discriminatory housing policies where the Fair Housing Act claim may or may not 
have been made but the court ruled on other grounds, such as under the Equal 
Protection Clause.  See, e.g., United Farmworkers of Fla. Hous. Project, Inc. v. City of 
Delray Beach, 493 F.2d 799, 811 n.12 (5th Cir. 1974) (declining to reach the FHA 
disparate impact housing claim after ruling on the claim under the Equal Protection 
Clause); see also Acevedo v. Nassau Cnty., 500 F.2d 1078, 1081 (2d Cir. 1974) (ruling 
on a disparate impact housing claim made under the Equal Protection Clause).   
 211. For an example of a case that was excluded because the court did not 
reach the disparate impact claim, see Bloch v. Frischholz, 587 F.3d 771, 784 (7th 
Cir. 2009), in which the court declined to reach disparate impact theory argued 
on appeal because it was not briefed or considered by the district court in 
summary judgment proceedings.  
 212. The analysis spanned from 1974, when the first disparate impact FHA case 
was decided, United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974), until 
June 30, 2013.   
 213. See generally Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (recognizing a 
discriminatory effects standard in employment discrimination cases brought under 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964). 
 214. See, e.g., In re Countrywide Fin. Corp. Mortg. Lending Practices Litig., 708 
F.3d 704, 705 (6th Cir. 2013) (affirming denial of class certification on disparate 
impact claim challenging delegation of discretion to local mortgage brokers on loan 
pricing policies); NAACP v. City of Kyle, 626 F.3d 233, 235 (5th Cir. 2010) (affirming 
denial of relief under FHA on other grounds, namely, based on lack of standing). 
 215. There is a case worth mentioning that evaded the Westlaw search because it 
was decided in 1974, after the Supreme Court adopted the disparate impact theory 
in Griggs, but before courts were regularly using terms such as “disparate impact” and 
“discriminatory effects”.  The case, Williams v. Matthews Co., 499 F.2d 819 (8th Cir. 
1974), is for all intents and purposes a disparate treatment case, but the court used 
Griggs and the “fair in form, [but] discriminatory in operation” language to close off 
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and are set forth in the Appendices.216  The analysis focuses on 
appellate cases, rather than on district court cases or settlements, 
both because of the accessibility of the data and because of the 
unique role played by appellate courts in shaping doctrine and 
controlling for perverse outcomes.  The analysis does not address 
how the litigants fared on any other claim they might have brought 
under the FHA or on any other constitutional or statutory grounds.  
First, this section discusses the outcomes in FHA disparate impact 
cases at the appellate level by decade, type of outcome, whether 
occurring pre-trial or post-trial, and rate of affirmance.  Second, this 
section provides an analysis of plaintiff and defendant outcomes at 
the appellate level by type of case, particularly with respect to housing 
barrier and housing improvement challenges. 
A. Party Outcomes in FHA Disparate Impact Cases, 1974–2013 
Litigants have attempted to use the disparate impact theory in 
varied housing transactions, on behalf of varied protected classes, and 
in varied contexts.  Few litigants have the resources to hire an expert 
to develop the kind of statistical analysis often important to establish 
a prima facie case of disparate impact.217  Many claims are dismissed 
                                                          
every possible escape route for a real estate developer who seems to have charmed 
his way out of liability at trial.  Id. at 827 n.9, 828.  The development company used a 
purportedly neutral policy as a non-discriminatory reason for refusing to sell a lot in 
an all-white subdivision to an African American family.  Id. at 828.  The policy, a 
requirement that lots be sold only to approved contractors, apparently was not 
applied to whites, was used as a delaying tactic, resulted in none of the approved 
contractors agreeing to sell to the plaintiff, and helped the developer stall in 
response to inquiries made by the only contractor who would work with the plaintiff, 
who was African American.  Id. at 828 & n.10.  The court reversed a bench trial 
decision in favor of defendant, primarily finding that the evidence established a 
prima facie case and the defendant’s policy both “carried racial overtones” and could 
not constitute a business necessity because it discriminated “in operation” and rested 
upon “pure chimera.”  Id. at 828. 
 216. Applied Westlaw search using the search terms:  disp! discrim! /2 impact! 
effect! & “fair housing act” FHA 3604.  The search was over-inclusive by design 
because there was no reliable way to use Westlaw headnotes or summaries to narrow 
the search without excluding pertinent cases.  Of the 278-case yield of appellate 
cases, the appellate courts reached the disparate impact FHA claim in ninety-two 
cases.  The analysis includes all pertinent cases yielded in the search, whether 
“reported” or “unreported.”  If the case generated multiple appellate decisions on its 
path to final resolution, it was not counted twice unless the multiple decisions dealt 
with wholly distinct disparate impact FHA claims.   
 217. See, e.g., Susan D. Carle, A Social Movement History of Title VII Disparate Impact 
Analysis, 63 FLA. L. REV. 251, 257 (2011) (“It is today very rare for plaintiffs other than 
highly sophisticated and well-funded litigants, such as the U.S. Department of Justice, 
to prevail under Title VII on a disparate impact theory.”); Stacy E. Seicshnaydre, Is 
the Road to Disparate Impact Paved with Good Intentions?:  Stuck on State of Mind in 
Antidiscrimination Law, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1141, 1147 n.31 (2007) (citing 
supporting case law where the litigant was unable to demonstrate a prima facie case 
due to a lack of statistical evidence). 
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at the summary judgment stage for this reason.218  As discussed above, 
some litigants tack on a disparate impact claim as added insurance 
when they are concerned about the strength of their intent 
evidence.219  As a result, some of these claims fail because they are 
inapplicable to the facts and are not well-developed.220 
What is abundantly clear when analyzing the FHA disparate impact 
case law over the past forty years is that the appellate courts have had 
little difficulty disposing of all manner of disparate impact claims 
under the FHA.  As shown in Figure 6, plaintiffs have received 
positive decisions221 in less than 20%, or eighteen of the ninety-two 
FHA disparate impact claims considered on appeal.222  When 
considering these results over four decades, it is apparent that the 
successes are concentrated in the 1970s and 1980s, with the rate of 
success for FHA disparate impact plaintiffs dropping in each decade 
thereafter.  To illustrate, all three of the FHA disparate impact cases 
considered by appellate courts in the 1970s resulted in positive 
decisions for plaintiffs.  This perfect success rate (based on an 
admittedly small number of cases) dipped in the 1980s, although 
plaintiffs obtained positive decisions in 47% of cases, or seven out of 
fifteen, where FHA disparate impact claims were considered on 
appeal.  In the 1990s, plaintiffs’ rate of success dropped further to 
13%, with only three out of twenty-three appellate cases resulting in a 
positive decision for plaintiffs on the FHA disparate impact claim.  In 
                                                          
 218. See infra Figure 4. 
 219. See Seicshnaydre, supra note 217, at 1147–49 (discussing how some plaintiffs 
bring disparate impact claims because of the notion that they are easier to prove 
than disparate treatment claims). 
 220. This Article does not purport to explain the reason for plaintiffs’ low win rate 
generally.  In the employment context, some commentators have offered an anti-
plaintiff attitudinal explanation for the differential reversal rates favoring defendants 
at the appellate level.  E.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, Employment 
Discrimination Plaintiffs in Federal Court:  From Bad to Worse?, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 
103, 104–05 (2009).  Authors Clermont and Schwab also provide a refutation of the 
anti-plaintiff effect as reflecting weak cases that are presented ineffectively and 
appealed too often.  Id. at 114 n.34. 
 221. Cf. Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Do Case Outcomes Really Reveal 
Anything About the Legal System?  Win Rates and Removal Jurisdiction, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 
581, 581 (1998) (“‘[W]in rates’ are probably the slipperiest of all judicial data.  Win 
rates are inherently ambiguous because of the case-selection effect . . . [which] 
produces a biased sample from the mass of underlying disputes.”). 
 222. In the analogous context of employment discrimination appeals, plaintiffs 
appear to obtain positive outcomes in 15% of all their cases, including appeals of 
both pretrial and trial adjudications.  See Clermont & Schwab, supra note 220, at 110 
(extrapolated from Display 2 using the reversal rates indicated for both plaintiffs and 
defendants yielding a calculation of 2073 positive outcomes for plaintiffs over 13,902 
total appeals).  At the federal district court level, over the period of 1979-2006, “the 
plaintiff win rate for jobs cases (15%) was much lower than that for non-jobs cases 
(51%).”  Id. at 127. 
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the 2000s, plaintiffs’ success rate dropped still further to 8.3%, with 
three out of thirty-six appellate cases resulting in positive decisions 
for plaintiffs.  Thus far in the current decade, plaintiffs have obtained 
positive outcomes in only two appellate cases, and the Supreme Court 
has granted certiorari in both of them, while defendants have 
obtained positive decisions in thirteen cases.  Although the rate of 
FHA disparate impact appeals has increased in each decade since the 
1970s, these increases have not resulted in a very large absolute 
number of cases for reviewing courts to consider, and the rate of 
increase in the current decade is thus far below that of the 2000s.223  
Further, despite the increase in appeals relating to FHA disparate 
impact claims, plaintiffs’ success rate is decreasing, with only a 
handful of cases each decade resulting in positive outcomes for 
plaintiffs.  These outcomes by decade are illustrated in Figure 1. 
Figure 1:  FHA Disparate Impact Decisions on Appeal                             
Party Outcomes by Decade 
 
It is also instructive to consider the nature of these eighteen 
“positive outcomes” for plaintiffs.  Figure 2 reveals that not every 
positive decision represents a final disposition on the merits.  Only 
nine cases, or half, involved review of final trial dispositions.  Five 
                                                          
 223. Three and one-half years into the current decade, reviewing courts have 
considered fifteen FHA disparate impact claims, which if the pattern continues, 
would result in forty-three total cases with FHA disparate impact claims on appeal in 
this decade.  This represents an increase of 19% from last decade.  The previous 
decade saw an increase of appeals from twenty-three in the 1990s to thirty-six in the 
2000s, or 56.5%. 
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cases affirmed a bench trial decision for plaintiff and four reversed a 
negative bench trial decision against plaintiff.  Four decisions merely 
reversed the dismissal of an FHA disparate impact claim at the 
pleading stage.  One decision recognized and delineated the 
disparate impact standard to be applied in FHA cases and remanded 
for the lower court to reach the merits.  Four cases reversed a 
dismissal of the FHA disparate impact claim on summary judgment.  
Figure 2:  FHA Disparate Impact Appellate Decisions—18 Positive Outcomes 
for Plaintiffs, 1974–2013 
With respect to the total of four decisions reversing the dismissal of 
FHA disparate impact claims on summary judgment, Figure 3 
demonstrates that two of these occurred this decade, in 2010 and 
2011, with the Supreme Court granting a writ of certiorari in each.  
Thus, prior to the Supreme Court’s recent willingness to grant 
certiorari to review the question whether the disparate impact theory 
of liability should apply under the FHA, only two appellate courts in 
forty years ever reversed the dismissal of plaintiffs’ FHA disparate 
impact claims on summary judgment.  This happened once in the 
late 1980s and once again twenty years later in the 2000s, as shown in 
Figure 3.  This compares to thirty-nine affirmances of summary 
judgments dismissing FHA disparate impact claims, one reversal of a 
denial of summary judgment for defendant, three reversals of 
summary judgments granted in plaintiffs’ favor, and a refusal to 
instruct the jury on disparate impact.  In sum, and as revealed in 
Figure 4, plaintiffs’ overall success rate on appeals of summary 
judgments in the FHA disparate impact context is four of forty-eight 
cases, less than 10% and less than the overall success rate of FHA 
disparate impact plaintiffs. 
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Figure 3:  FHA Disparate Impact Appellate Decisions—18 Positive Decisions 
for Plaintiffs 
 
Moreover, the two positive decisions before 2010 reversing 
summary judgment dismissals of FHA disparate impact claims are 
limited.  The first case, Doe v. City of Butler,224 decided in 1989, cannot 
even fairly be described as a reversal. The Third Circuit actually 
affirmed summary judgment on the claim before it, a sex-based FHA 
disparate impact challenge by domestic violence victims to an 
ordinance limiting the number of occupants in transitional 
dwellings.225  The positive outcome consisted of the Third Circuit’s 
remand to consider whether the challenged ordinance had a 
disparate impact on the basis of familial status, a newly protected 
category under the FHA that Congress added after the district court 
had ruled.226  The second case, Committee Concerning Community 
Improvement v. City of Modesto,227 decided in 2009, involved four 
predominantly Latino neighborhoods outside the city of Modesto 
that challenged the city’s and county’s failure to annex them into the 
                                                          
 224. 892 F.2d 315 (3d Cir. 1989). 
 225. Id. at 323. 
 226. Id. at 323–24.   
 227. 583 F.3d 690 (9th Cir. 2009). 
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city and otherwise provide adequate municipal services.228  The 
positive outcome in this case was technically a reversal of the earlier 
dismissal of the FHA claim made at the pleading stage, although the 
Ninth Circuit restored only part of the FHA claim based on summary 
judgment evidence of impact considered in the context of other 
claims.229  The appellate court found the summary judgment 
disparate impact evidence insufficient to support a claim relating to 
the provision of sewer services, but sufficient to support a claim 
relating to the provision of law-enforcement personnel.230 
Thus, the two “reversals” of summary judgment dismissals of FHA 
disparate impact claims prior to 2010 are not sweeping victories for 
plaintiffs.  Rather, one has to parse these opinions carefully to 
identify the disparate impact slivers that survive dismissal.  Also, 
neither of these reversals involved a challenge to a housing 
improvement plan. 
Figure 4:  FHA Disparate Impact Pre-trial Decisions on Appeal,   1974–2013 
 
In addition to summary judgment affirmances, Figure 4 
demonstrates defendants’ rate of affirmance for dismissals of 
plaintiffs’ FHA disparate impact claims, with defendants obtaining 
eight affirmances and plaintiffs obtaining five reversals of complaint 
                                                          
 228. Id. at 696. 
 229. Id. at 699–700, 714–15.  The Ninth Circuit restored the FHA claim after 
concluding, contrary to the district court, that the FHA did apply to discrimination 
occurring after the acquisition of housing.  Id. at 714. 
 230. Id. at 714–15. 
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dismissals.231  Further, defendants were able to have two denials of 
preliminary injunction motions affirmed, and one disparate impact 
finding for plaintiff reversed at the preliminary injunction stage. 
When considering post-trial decisions on appeal, Figure 5 
demonstrates that plaintiffs and defendants are about even with 
respect to their ability to obtain positive outcomes following bench 
trials, with plaintiffs able to affirm five positive and reverse four 
negative FHA disparate impact bench trial decisions.  Defendants 
were able to affirm nine positive and reverse one negative FHA 
disparate impact bench trial decisions.  Defendants were also able to 
reverse two HUD administrative law judge (“ALJ”) decisions and one 
HUD Secretary decision.  Plaintiffs obtained no positive outcomes on 
appeal with respect to jury verdicts, whereas defendants were able to 
have three positive jury verdicts affirmed and three negative jury 
verdicts reversed, as shown in Figure 5. 
Figure 5:  FHA Disparate Impact Post-Trial Decisions on Appeal, 1974–2013 
 
Next, as shown in Figure 6, when considering the affirmance rates 
for plaintiffs and defendants generally, the data shows that 
defendants were able to affirm positive decisions obtained in the 
lower courts in sixty-two of seventy-four cases, or 83.8% of the time.  
                                                          
 231. Included in the category of plaintiff reversals and other on complaint 
dismissals is the Seventh Circuit’s decision on remand in Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. 
Vill. of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1288–90 (7th Cir. 1977) (finding that a 
showing of discriminatory effects could state a claim under the FHA). 
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The affirmance rate generally for federal civil appeals is thought to 
be about 80%.232  By contrast, plaintiffs were able to have positive 
results obtained in the lower courts affirmed in only six of eighteen 
cases, or 33.3% of the time.  Thus, plaintiffs in FHA disparate impact 
cases fared far worse than average when considering the generally 
high rate of affirmance in federal civil appeals, while defendants 
enjoyed an affirmance rate that was better than average.  Stated 
another way, defendants were able to have 66.7% of plaintiffs’ 
positive decisions on FHA disparate impact claims reversed, while 
plaintiffs were able to reverse only 16.2% of defendants’ positive 
decisions on these claims. 
Figure 6:  FHA Disparate Impact Outcomes on Appeal, 1974–2013 
 Pro-Defendant 
Outcomes on Appeal
Pro-Plaintiff Outcomes 
on Appeal 
Reversal Rate 66.7% 
(12/18 lower court wins 
for plaintiff reversed)
16.2% 
(12/74 lower court wins 
for defendant reversed) 
Affirmance Rate 83.8% 
(62/74 lower court wins 
for defendant affirmed)
33.3% 
(6/18 lower court wins 
for plaintiff affirmed) 
TOTAL OUTCOMES 80.4% 
(74/92 CASES)
19.6% 
(18/92 CASES) 
 
Whatever has prompted the Court’s sudden interest in examining 
the question of disparate impact liability under the FHA, this interest 
cannot be attributable to plaintiffs’ high rate of success or the 
appellate courts’ general unwillingness to impose a rigorous and 
exacting review of the claims at every stage of the proceedings. 
B. Data by FHA Disparate Impact Case Type:  Housing Barrier and 
Housing Improvement Cases 
Based on the data analysis below, there appears to be a discernible 
difference in the way the appellate courts have reviewed challenges to 
“housing barrier” regulations as opposed to “housing improvement” 
plans and regulations.  In the ninety-two appellate decisions 
considering FHA disparate impact challenges, nineteen cases dealt 
                                                          
 232. See Clermont and Schwab, supra note 220, at 106 (comparing plaintiffs’ 
win rates generally to win rates in jobs cases in district and appellate courts from 
1979 to 2006). 
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with housing barrier rules and fourteen challenged housing 
improvement or redevelopment plans.  Another fourteen challenged 
policies or regulations on the basis of disparate impact against 
persons with disabilities.233  Although not all disparate impact claims 
center on these case types, these were the three most common FHA 
disparate impact challenges reviewed by the appellate courts, as 
reflected in Figure 7.234 
Figure 7:  FHA Disparate Impact Appeals by Case Type, 1974–2013 
 
Comparing the rates of success of the housing barrier and housing 
improvement challenges at the appellate level, the housing barrier 
challenges were twice as successful.  As reflected in Figure 8, the 
housing barrier disparate impact challenges were successful 42% of 
the time (eight of nineteen cases), whereas the housing improvement 
disparate impact challenges were successful 21% of the time (three of 
                                                          
 233. Even though the disability-based challenges can be described as seeking to 
overcome “barriers” for persons with disabilities, they are not included with the 
“barrier” cases because of the distinct statutory requirements at issue in these cases, 
such as the requirement that housing providers make “reasonable accommodations 
in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary 
to afford such person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.”  42 U.S.C. 
§ 3604(f)(3)(B).   
 234. As illustrated in Figure 7 and Appendix B, the remainder of the ninety-two 
FHA disparate impact challenges include ten involving various challenges to rental 
policies and practices; ten involving challenges to occupancy restrictions or other 
rules on the basis of familial status; five involving lending and appraisal practices; 
another five involving housing authority policies; four involving housing cooperative 
and condominium rules; and three involving a city’s failure to maintain or provide 
municipal services to property. Eight additional appeals in Figure 7 are included 
under the category of “other” (highway site selection, city and state funding 
priorities, steering, and housing advertising restrictions).  
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fourteen cases).  Thus, plaintiffs challenging housing improvement 
regulations are achieving the same rate of success as are FHA 
disparate impact plaintiffs on average.  On the other hand, plaintiffs 
challenging housing barrier regulations are twice as successful as 
FHA disparate impact plaintiffs on average.235 
Figure 8:  FHA Disparate Impact Outcomes on Appeal by Case Type,      
1974–2013 
 
The Magner and Mount Holly decisions comprise two of the three 
positive decisions in the housing improvement context.  Stated 
another way, before 2011 when the Court decided to review the 
disparate impact standard under the FHA, only one FHA disparate 
impact challenge to housing improvement plans had resulted in a 
positive outcome for plaintiffs at the appellate level.  This is Charleston 
Housing Authority, discussed in Part II.236 
When shifting focus to examine the type of cases comprising the 
body of appellate case law resulting in positive decisions for plaintiffs, 
                                                          
 235. See supra notes 221–222 and accompanying text (explaining win rates 
generally and positive outcomes specifically for disparate impact claims on appeal); 
see supra Figure 6 (showing that FHA disparate impact outcomes on appeal were 
successful 19.6% of the time). 
 236. See supra Figure 8; see also supra notes 170–173 and accompanying text 
(explaining the Eighth Circuit decision to uphold the district court’s finding that the 
housing authority’s demolition plan had a racially disparate impact, and remanding 
for the district court to identify an alternative to the proposed re-occupancy that 
would further fair housing). 
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which constitutes eighteen of ninety-two cases,237 the most successful 
claims brought by plaintiffs were housing barrier claims.  Eight of the 
eighteen, or 44.4% of all positive FHA disparate impact decisions at 
the appellate level were challenges to housing barriers.  The next 
most successful type of claim among the positive outcomes for 
plaintiffs were challenges to neutral occupancy rules or other 
restrictions on the basis of familial status, at five of the eighteen, 
or 27.8%. 
Only three cases out of the eighteen positive decisions, or 16.7%, 
involved challenges to housing improvement plans.  These results are 
reflected in Figure 9. 
Figure 9:  FHA Disparate Impact—Distribution of 18 Positive Outcomes for 
Plaintiffs on Appeal by Case Type, 1974–2013 
 
These data show that the predominant type of FHA disparate 
impact claim on appeal and also the predominant type of claim on 
which plaintiffs are receiving positive outcomes at the appellate level 
is the housing barrier claim.  Thus, to the extent that appellate courts 
have had forty years to oversee the application of disparate impact 
theory in FHA cases, they have been far more receptive to housing 
barrier claims than housing improvement claims. 
Following the filing of the certiorari petition in Magner, but before 
the filing of the petition in Mount Holly, the federal agency with 
authority to interpret the FHA decided to weigh in.238  The next Part 
                                                          
 237. See supra Part III.A (discussing the eighteen positive decisions for plaintiffs in 
FHA disparate impact appeals). 
 238. See 42 U.S.C. § 3608(a) (assigning the authority and responsibility of 
administering the FHA to the Secretary of the HUD); id. § 3608(e) (delineating the 
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analyzes HUD’s disparate impact rule and how it might apply to 
housing improvement challenges. 
IV. HUD’S DISPARATE IMPACT RULE AND ITS APPLICATION TO 
HOUSING IMPROVEMENT CASES 
Despite the unanimity among the circuits that a disparate impact 
method of proof is cognizable under the FHA, a number of different 
standards have proliferated over the past four decades.239  The 
petitions for certiorari in both Magner and Mount Holly raised the 
question of which test should govern review of FHA disparate impact 
cases.240  In November 2011, between the filing of the two certiorari 
petitions, HUD issued a proposed rule interpreting the disparate 
impact standard in FHA cases.241  On February 15, 2013, after the 
Mount Holly petition was filed, but before it was granted, HUD issued 
its Final Rule, entitled “Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s 
Discriminatory Effects Standard.”242  HUD issued its rule after 
decades of adopting and applying the disparate impact standard in 
formal adjudications, policy statements, and guidance to its staff.243 
In addition to recognizing the validity of a disparate impact 
approach in FHA cases, HUD’s disparate impact rule sets forth the 
parties’ burdens and the burden-shifting framework to be applied.244  
In doing so, HUD opted for the burden shifting approach over the 
                                                          
functions of the Secretary in performing this responsibility); id. § 3614a (“The 
Secretary may make rules . . . to carry out this subchapter.”). 
 239. For example, some courts apply a burden-shifting framework similar to that 
applied in Title VII cases, whereas other courts apply a four-factor balancing test.  
Compare Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 938–39 
(2d Cir.) (applying burden-shifting approach), aff’d per curiam, 488 U.S. 15 (1988), 
with Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1290 (7th 
Cir. 1977) (applying four-factor balancing test).  See generally SCHWEMM & PRATT, supra 
note 1, at 21 (noting “that only a few appellate decisions have carefully examined the 
burden of justification in a FHA impact case, and these decisions reflect, accurately, 
that some issues have not been authoritatively resolved”).  
 240. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Magner v. Gallagher, 132 S. Ct. 1306 
(2011) (No. 10-1032) (asking, if disparate claims are indeed cognizable under the 
Fair Housing Act, whether they should “be analyzed under the burden shifting 
approach used by three circuits, under the balancing test used by four circuits, under 
a hybrid approach used by two circuits, or by some other test”); see also Mount Holly 
Cert. Petition, supra note 143, at i (same).  
 241. Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 
76 Fed. Reg. 70,921 (proposed Nov. 16, 2011) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 100). 
 242. Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 
78 Fed. Reg. 11,460 (Feb. 15, 2013) (codified in 24 C.F.R. pt. 100). 
 243. See id. at 11,461–62 (discussing how HUD has consistently interpreted the 
disparate impact standard throughout its FHA enforcement history). 
 244. Id. at 11,479. 
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four-factor balancing test.245  The plaintiff bears the burden of 
proving its prima facie case by showing “that a challenged practice 
caused or predictably will cause a discriminatory effect.”246  
Discriminatory effect is defined as a practice that “actually or 
predictably results in a disparate impact on a group of persons or 
creates, increases, reinforces, or perpetuates segregated housing 
patterns because of race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial 
status, or national origin.”247  Once the plaintiff meets its prima facie 
burden, the defendant has “the burden of proving that the 
challenged practice is necessary to achieve one or more substantial, 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory interests of the respondent or 
defendant.”248  If the defendant meets its burden of justification, the 
“plaintiff may still prevail upon proving that the substantial, 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory interests supporting the challenged 
practice could be served by another practice that has a less 
discriminatory effect.”249 
HUD emphasizes in its preamble to the Final Rule that “HUD is 
not proposing new law in this area.”250  In particular, HUD’s rule does 
not create a new standard on plaintiff’s prima facie burden other 
than “that a challenged practice caused or predictably will cause a 
discriminatory effect.”251  As the review of the case law in Part II 
demonstrates, a prima facie showing of disparate impact is not as 
easily made in a housing improvement case as might be expected.252  
Except in the rare instances where courts assumed that the prima 
facie case was made, they often rejected plaintiffs’ prima facie 
evidence in both code enforcement and revitalization cases because it 
was limited to the group disproportionately affected by the housing 
                                                          
 245. See id. at 11,463 (explaining that some courts have embraced a four-factor test 
over the burden-shifting framework in FHA cases). 
 246. 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(c)(1) (2013).   
 247. Id. § 100.500(a).  
 248. Id. § 100.500(c)(2).  
 249. Id. § 100.500(c)(3).  
 250. Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 
78 Fed. Reg. at 11,462.  HUD goes on to state that “this final rule embodies law that 
has been in place for almost four decades and that has consistently been applied, 
with minor variations, by HUD, the Justice Department and nine other federal 
agencies, and federal courts.”  Id.  
 251. 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(c)(1).  
 252. See supra Part II.D; see also Dana L. Miller, Comment, HOPE VI and Title VIII:  
How a Justifying Government Purpose Can Overcome the Disparate Impact Problem, 47 
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1277, 1296 (2003) (noting that despite the likelihood that any 
demolition and revitalization plan will have a disparate impact on public 
housing occupants, who are overwhelmingly protected class members, “this fact 
alone does not guarantee the plaintiff will be successful in making out a prima 
facie case”). 
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“improvement” plan.253  Many courts have found it insufficient to 
show simply that those displaced by a plan or scheme are 
predominantly or even exclusively members of minority groups.254  
Plaintiffs must also show that the plan has a disproportionately lesser 
impact on unprotected groups.255  HUD’s final regulation, which 
does not alter the law on plaintiffs’ prima facie showing, would not 
likely have altered any negative case outcomes in the housing 
improvement arena. 
Nor would HUD’s disparate impact rule necessarily have altered 
the outcomes of Magner and Mount Holly at the circuit court level, 
given that these cases turned, at least in part, on the question of 
whether plaintiffs met their prima facie burdens.  Further, the courts 
found that plaintiffs created a fact issue on the burden HUD has now 
placed with plaintiffs:  whether an alternative exists that would 
accomplish defendant’s legitimate interests with less discriminatory 
effect.256  The Magner and Mount Holly decisions can be reconciled 
with the greater number of plaintiff losses in housing improvement 
cases at the appellate level.  As an initial matter, the paucity of 
successful outcomes for plaintiffs in housing improvement cases 
undermines any suggestion that the FHA disparate impact standard is 
regularly producing perverse outcomes.  At the same time, summary 
judgment will not always be an appropriate vehicle for resolving FHA 
disparate impact challenges to housing improvement plans.  In Gomez 
v. Chody, the complex had been declared a public nuisance, so the 
court showed little interest in examining impact.257  In other cases, 
including Mount Holly, the degree of blight in a building, 
                                                          
 253. See supra text accompanying notes 177–88 (reviewing cases where the 
plaintiffs’ challenges to a city’s code enforcement scheme or redevelopment plan 
failed because the plaintiffs did not show the impact on minorities in the 
community generally). 
 254. Id. 
 255. See supra text accompanying notes 201– 03 (discussing how the dismissal of 
the plaintiffs’ claims in Bonvillian v. Lawler-Wood Housing, LLC were affirmed because 
the disputed action equally affected all parties with no disparate impact on protected 
class members).   
 256. The Mount Holly court placed this final burden of proof on defendants, but 
found that plaintiff had created a fact issue on whether an alternative to demolition 
existed that would serve defendant’s interests with less discriminatory effect.  See 
supra note 163 and accompanying text.  The Magner court placed the final burden on 
plaintiff, consistent with HUD’s subsequently enacted regulation.  See supra notes 
138–39, 248-49 and accompanying text. 
 257. See supra note 198 and accompanying text (describing how the court in Gomez 
affirmed summary judgment because liability could not be established when every 
resident was displaced after the entire complex was declared a public nuisance and 
unfit for human habitation).   
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neighborhood, or town is a matter of considerable factual dispute.258  
What should be done about that blight, namely, whether demolition 
is justified, is a matter of even greater dispute.  Allegations of 
discriminatory targeting and intent also may need to be assessed.  At 
the heart of many housing improvement cases seems to be the notion 
that towns manage blight differently—whether they realize it or not—
depending on the racial and ethnic makeup of those residing in 
structures deemed blighted.259  Given the fact that housing 
improvement plans have operated in particular cases to prevent the 
return of minorities to the “improved” area, it is understandable for 
residents targeted for displacement to view such plans with 
skepticism.260  Community and neighborhood revitalization plans will 
almost always be legitimate in the abstract, but whether they are 
racially exclusionary will depend on the facts of a particular case. 
Further complicating the picture in housing improvement cases is 
the fact that HUD’s disparate impact regulation reflects the caselaw 
defining discriminatory effect in more than one way.  A plaintiff can 
demonstrate discriminatory effects when the plan:  1) “actually or 
predictably results in a disparate impact on a group of persons,” or 2) 
                                                          
 258. See, e.g., Hispanics United of DuPage Cnty. v. Vill. of Addison, 988 F. Supp. 
1130, 1152 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (“[T]he plaintiffs did not take issue with the general need 
for redevelopment . . . .  What they objected to was the Village’s aggressive manner of 
redevelopment, which, plaintiffs claimed, was wholly unjustified given that these were 
habitable buildings—buildings that had a lengthy future economic life, were 
increasing in sales value, were licensed yearly as in compliance with the Housing 
Code, and were no more densely situated than the average multi-family rental 
structures in Addison.”); see also Miller, supra note 252, at 1306 (“[M]any maintain 
that the [HOPE VI public housing revitalization] program has been broadly applied 
to fund the demolition of units that are not truly distressed.  For example, in areas 
where gentrification has begun and a public housing site remains as the last ‘island 
of affordability,’ there can be considerable pressure to use . . . grant money to reduce 
the number of affordable units in the area while freeing up real estate for market-
rate units.” (footnote omitted)). 
 259. See, e.g., Hispanics United, 988 F. Supp. at 1155 (“Further evidence of 
discriminatory effect is found in the fact that the Village began [redevelopment] 
activities in majority Hispanic areas, and never reached the vacant, deteriorating 
commercial sites or predominantly non-minority sectors in the districts.”). 
 260. See id. at 1141 (noting that “[t]he Village did not discuss replacing any of the 
units demolished or removed from the market in these neighborhoods with 
affordable housing until after plaintiffs had filed suit”); Resident Advisory Bd. v. 
Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 129–33 (3d Cir. 1977) (describing the refusal of a virtually all 
white urban renewal community to accept the replacement low income housing that 
was to be constructed in the community years after the low income residents, many 
of whom were black or Hispanic, were displaced); see also Miller, supra note 252, at 
1284 (“The fact that most public housing residents whose suffering justified the 
revitalization activities do not return after the revitalization has been completed has 
been widely recognized . . . .”); cf. Keith v. Volpe, 858 F.2d 467, 471, 484 (9th Cir. 
1988) (affirming trial court injunction for residents displaced by a freeway 
construction against city’s refusal to permit construction of replacement units; 
plaintiffs demonstrated disparate impact under FHA based on fact that two-thirds of 
those who would benefit from replacement housing were minorities).  
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“creates, increases, reinforces, or perpetuates segregated housing 
patterns” because of a protected category.261  The effect of a housing 
improvement plan on segregated housing patterns may depend on 
whether short-term or long-terms effects are evaluated.  A housing 
improvement plan may have an adverse impact on a community of 
color in the immediate aftermath of its adoption and 
implementation, but over time it may have the effect of increasing 
housing opportunity and reducing segregation.  On the other hand, 
a housing improvement plan may purport to reduce segregation in a 
generic or superficial way, but its implementation might achieve the 
exact opposite effect and increase segregation because the plan lacks 
any detailed mechanism for achieving its purported purpose.  For 
example, after displacement, minority residents of the area targeted 
for “improvement” may relocate to other segregated neighborhoods 
or may be excluded from the improved and integrated 
neighborhood, as discussed above.  Summary judgment will not be 
appropriate if the plaintiff creates a fact issue on whether a housing 
improvement plan sets the stage for exclusion and segregation. 
In the end, an FHA disparate impact challenge to a housing 
improvement plan or regulation must be framed by the purposes of 
the statute and not merely to maintain the status quo of substandard 
housing.  The FHA is concerned with more than whether housing is 
substandard and if it is, whether it must be demolished or whether it 
can be rehabilitated.  The FHA is concerned with opportunity, and 
the fact that a plan results in the disproportionate displacement of 
minorities does not reveal, by itself, the overall impact on housing 
opportunity and segregation.  HUD’s disparate impact rule can be 
applied to ensure that the FHA’s purposes are achieved.  For 
example, the revitalization justification “must be supported by 
evidence and may not be hypothetical or speculative.”262  This means 
that a plan must provide sufficient detail so that its impact on 
housing opportunity and integration may be ascertained. 
If the challenged plan revitalizes housing while setting the stage for 
exclusion and increased segregation, then the defendant’s 
revitalization justification cannot be deemed legitimate and 
nondiscriminatory as required under the rule, because it is serving as 
a gateway to a housing barrier plan.263  On the other hand, if the 
                                                          
 261. 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(a) (2013).   
 262. 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(b)(2) (2013). 
 263. See id. § 100.500(c)(2); see also Resident Advisory Bd., 564 F.2d at 133 (citing the 
district court’s conclusion that “[t]he effect of these urban clearance actions by both 
RDA and PHA appears to have converted an integrated area of Philadelphia into a 
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housing improvement plan helps facilitate the purposes of the FHA, 
such as creating more housing opportunity and integration, the 
revitalization justification will be legitimate, and it will be more 
difficult for the plaintiff to identify a less discriminatory alternative.  
The question whether a less discriminatory alternative exists must 
center on whether there is an alternative to the challenged housing 
improvement plan that will both revitalize housing or neighborhoods 
and increase housing opportunity and integration.  HUD has now 
placed this final, substantial burden on plaintiffs. 
If history is any judge, most of these FHA housing improvement 
challenges will continue to be dismissed on summary judgment.  The 
lower courts have demonstrated that they are more than capable of 
applying a narrowly circumscribed FHA disparate impact standard.  
However, in those cases where the defendants’ revitalization plans are 
flimsy or plaintiffs can create a fact issue on less exclusionary 
alternatives, a trial is a small price to pay for integration.  Thus, the 
FHA can serve as an important check on housing improvement plans 
operating as the functional equivalent of housing barrier plans.   
After HUD issued its final rule, the Solicitor General submitted a 
brief in Mount Holly suggesting that review of the FHA disparate 
impact standard was unwarranted because the appellate courts had 
not yet had the opportunity to interpret HUD’s final rule.264  Further, 
the Solicitor General suggested that the case was not a proper vehicle 
for review of the disparate impact standard because the parties had 
not pressed the issue in the lower courts and the appeal was 
interlocutory, as the Third Circuit had merely reversed summary 
judgment and remanded the case for trial.265  The Court granted 
certiorari nonetheless on June 17, 2013 to decide the sole question of 
whether disparate impact claims are cognizable under section 804(a) 
of the FHA.266  Like Magner, the case resolved prior to oral argument, 
again preventing Supreme Court review.267 
                                                          
non-integrated area” (quoting Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 425 F. Supp. 987, 1009 
(E.D. Pa. 1976))). 
 264. Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae at 6, Twp. of Mount Holly v. Mt. 
Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc., No. 11-1507 (2013). 
 265. Id. at 21–22. 
 266. See Twp. of Mount Holly v. Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens In Action, Inc., 133 
S. Ct. 2824 (2013) (granting petition for writ of certiorari to the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit), cert. dismissed, No. 11-1507, 2013 WL 6050174 
(Nov. 15, 2013). 
 267. Mount Holly, 2013 WL 6050174 (Nov. 15, 2013) (dismissing certiorari 
pursuant to Rule 46.1 of the Rules of the Supreme Court). 
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V. WILL THE FHA DISPARATE IMPACT THEORY SURVIVE? 
Assuming the Court continues to grant certiorari on the question, 
it will likely engage in a statutory construction analysis to determine 
the validity of the FHA disparate impact theory.  The parties and 
amici have covered and will continue to cover this subject extensively 
in their briefs, and this Article does not seek to improve on their 
analysis so much as provide a historical and contextual framework for 
considering the FHA disparate impact theory.  That said, this Article 
offers the following brief observations. 
The earliest circuit courts to adopt the disparate impact theory of 
proof for FHA cases did not ignore issues of statutory construction.  
They concluded that the “because of race” language of the FHA 
could be satisfied by a showing of discriminatory effect without a 
showing of discriminatory intent.268  In so doing, these courts and 
those that followed considered the broad legislative purposes 
underlying the FHA,269 judicial interpretations of analogous language 
in Title VII,270 and the common sense notion that a party can 
undertake an act “because of race” if “the natural and foreseeable 
consequence of that act is to discriminate between races, regardless 
of . . . intent.”271  The Court denied petitions for certiorari in three of 
                                                          
 268. See, e.g., Resident Advisory Bd., 564 F.2d at 146–47 (analogizing to the statutory 
text of Title VII and concluding that a prima facie case of liability can be made in 
FHA cases on a showing of discriminatory effect); Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of 
Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1288–90 (7th Cir. 1977) (finding, in the context of 
a housing barrier regulation, that “a violation of section 3604(a) can be established 
by a showing of discriminatory effect without a showing of discriminatory intent”); see 
also Langlois v. Abington Hous. Auth., 207 F.3d 43, 49 (1st Cir. 2000) (citing 
consensus of other circuit courts that the FHA can be violated by actions that have an 
unjustified racial impact); United States v. City of Parma, 494 F. Supp. 1049, 1054–55 
(N.D. Ohio 1980), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 661 F.2d 562 (6th Cir. 1981).  The court 
in City of Black Jack found that a prima facie case could be made on the basis of 
discriminatory effects, meaning “that the conduct of the defendant actually or 
predictably results in racial discrimination,” then on the facts of the case held 
the City’s ordinance violated Title VIII because it denied persons housing “on 
the basis of race.”  United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1184, 1188 
(8th Cir. 1974). 
 269. E.g., Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 934–
39 (2d Cir.), aff’d per curiam, 488 U.S. 15 (1998); Resident Advisory Board, 564 F.2d at 
147; Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d at 1289–90; City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d at 1184. 
 270. See, e.g., Huntington Branch, 844 F.2d at 934–35 (accepting the relevance of 
Title VII and finding the disparate impact approach applicable to Title VIII cases); 
Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d at 1288–89 (rejecting the argument that Congress 
required a “more probing standard of review” for Title VII cases); Resident Advisory 
Bd., 564 F.2d at 147 (noting that the same “because of race” language appears in 
Title VII and does not require a showing of discriminatory intent); City of Black Jack, 
508 F.2d at 1184 (noting that Congress requires the removal of racial barriers in the 
employment context, so “such barriers must also give way in the field of housing”).  
 271. Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d at 1288; cf. Carle, supra note 217, at 286–87 (“The 
idea that both invidious and neutral employment practices could cause 
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the early cases to recognize disparate impact claims under the FHA.272  
In another, Huntington, the Court affirmed part of the judgment 
“[w]ithout endorsing the precise analysis” of the Second Circuit.273  
Some courts also noted the Supreme Court’s acknowledgment on 
several occasions that different proof standards applied to 
constitutional and statutory civil rights claims.274  Although a 
proliferation of standards emerged, no circuit split emerged in the 
last forty years on the validity of FHA disparate impact theory. 
Further, although Congress amended Title VII in 1991 to 
incorporate the disparate impact standard, it neither 
contemporaneously amended nor simultaneously considered the 
FHA such that Congress can be presumed to have intentionally 
omitted a disparate impact provision from the FHA.275  Moreover, 
none of the judicially created, burden shifting methods of proof 
generated over the history of Title VII and Title VIII can be found in 
the text of the FHA.276  Though the FHA is clear that race (along with 
other factors) is a prohibited basis for an action, it does not specify 
any methods of proof.277  For example, the FHA has not been 
amended to state that the burden-shifting approach set forth in 
McDonnell Douglas for disparate treatment cases is the appropriate 
                                                          
discrimination was familiar to both public officials and activists seeking solutions to 
structural racial subordination [in the period leading up to the Griggs decision].”). 
 272. See, e.g., Resident Advisory Bd., 564 F.2d 126 (housing barrier regulation), cert. 
denied, 435 U.S. 908 (1978); Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283 (housing barrier 
regulation), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978); City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179 
(housing barrier regulation), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975).   
 273. Huntington Branch, 488 U.S. at 18. 
 274. For example, in Resident Advisory Board, the court noted the Supreme Court’s 
observation in Washington v. Davis that the effects standard would have been proper 
for a Title VII case but was insufficient to support a constitutional violation. Resident 
Advisory Bd., 564 F.2d at 147 (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 246–48 
(1976)); accord Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d at 1288–89.  Also, in Arlington Heights, the 
Supreme Court remanded for the Seventh Circuit to consider the FHA claim after it 
noted the constitutional claim must fail on the same evidence.  Vill. of Arlington 
Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977), remanded to 558 F.2d 1283; 
see also Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d at 1287 (“[T]he Supreme Court’s decision does not 
require us to change our previous conclusion that the Village’s action had a racially 
discriminatory effect.  What the Court held is that under the Equal Protection Clause 
that conclusion is irrelevant.”).   
 275. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(2012); id. § 3604; cf. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 
557 U.S. 167, 174–75 (2009) (refusing to apply Title VII’s mixed motive burden-
shifting framework to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) because 
Congress considered the two statutes simultaneously in 1991 and amended Title VII 
to include a mixed motive framework while neglecting to include such a provision in 
its contemporaneous amendments to the ADEA). 
 276. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619 (failing to mention or give any indication of a 
burden-shifting framework suggested by the courts). 
 277. See, e.g., id. § 3604(a) (prohibiting any refusal to “sell or rent after the making 
of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise 
make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race”). 
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method of proving that an action was taken “because of race.”278  Yet, 
all of the courts of appeal that have considered the question have 
held that the McDonnell Douglas framework should also be available 
under the FHA.279  To eliminate the disparate impact method of 
proof borrowed from Title VII because it is not written into the 
FHA, while accepting the other burden-shifting methods of proof 
borrowed from Title VII, but absent from the FHA statutory text, 
is disingenuous.280 
Finally, the Court held in 2005 that the disparate impact proof 
standard was available in cases brought under the Age Discrimination 
in Employment Act in large part because Justice Scalia wrote a 
concurring opinion noting that EEOC regulations interpreted the 
ADEA to include a disparate impact standard.281  HUD issued a 
regulation in 2013 interpreting the FHA to include a disparate 
impact standard, consistent with prior HUD regulations, guidance, 
and administrative decisions.282  It remains to be seen whether Justice 
Scalia will vote to uphold the disparate impact standard under the 
FHA.283  It also remains to be seen whether the Court will select an 
FHA case as a vehicle for applying Equal Protection analysis to quash 
disparate impact liability against governmental entities, as more fully 
explored below. 
VI. SHOULD THE FHA DISPARATE IMPACT THEORY SURVIVE? 
Following the qualitative and quantitative analysis set forth in this 
paper, the question arises whether the FHA disparate impact theory 
                                                          
 278. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 804 (1973) 
(requiring a plaintiff in a Title VII claim to first establish his prima facie case, then 
switching the burden to the defendant to provide a nondiscriminatory reason for 
rejecting employment, which may then be rebutted by the plaintiff as pretext). 
 279. See SCHWEMM, supra note 12, § 10:2 (collecting cases); cf. Gross, 557 U.S. at 175 
n.2 (2009) (noting that “the Court has not definitively decided whether the 
evidentiary framework of [McDonnell Douglas] utilized in Title VII cases is appropriate 
in the ADEA context”). 
 280. See Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 935 
(2d Cir.) (“Courts and commentators have observed that the two statutes require 
similar proof to establish a violation.”), aff’d per curiam, 488 U.S. 15 (1988).  
 281. Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 247 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring in 
part and concurring in the judgment).  Describing the case to be “an absolutely 
classic case for deference to agency interpretation,” id. at 243, Justice Scalia went on 
to find that “[t]he EEOC has express authority to promulgate rules and regulations 
interpreting the ADEA.  It has exercised that authority to recognize disparate-impact 
claims.  And, for the reasons given by the plurality opinion, its position is eminently 
reasonable.  In my view, that is sufficient to resolve this case.”  Id. at 247.  
 282. Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 
78 Fed. Reg. 11,460 (Feb. 15, 2013) (codified in 24 C.F.R. pt. 100). 
 283. Justice Kennedy joined Justice O’Connor’s minority opinion (also joined by 
Justice Thomas) that disparate impact claims were not cognizable under the ADEA.  
Smith, 544 U.S. at 247–48 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment).   
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remains viable in the current era.  What purpose does the theory 
serve, given its relatively low rate of success, the expense and 
expertise necessary to mount a successful disparate impact challenge, 
its potentially perverse use in the context of housing improvement 
plans, and the presumed availability of disparate treatment as an 
alternative theory should the Court eliminate disparate impact?284  
Despite the limitations of the theory, the disparate impact method 
of proof remains a vital tool for accomplishing the elusive aims of 
the FHA. 
First, the theory’s limited success, undoubtedly because of the 
confusion surrounding the theory and the expense involved in 
establishing a prima facie case, is an inadequate reason to end the 
theory.285  If anything, the inaccessibility of the claim for most 
plaintiffs would seem to limit the number of claims and the judicial 
resources required to be expended on them, should the Court be 
concerned about that issue.286  In general, the number of FHA 
administrative claims filed each year is a small fraction of the number 
of employment claims filed annually.287  Given the unanimity in the 
lower courts for many decades on the availability of the FHA 
disparate impact standard, a decision by the Supreme Court 
recognizing this standard is not likely to create a litigation explosion. 
Second, there is no need for panic over the notion that community 
revitalization plans and code enforcement schemes are subject to 
challenge using the disparate impact method of proof.  Of course, 
                                                          
 284. See Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. 
REV. 701, 701 (2006) (examining the limited success of the disparate impact 
theory in the context of employment discrimination and arguing that “the theory 
may have had the unintended effect of limiting our conception of intentional 
discrimination”). 
 285. Cf. Carle, supra note 217, at 298 (“[L]itigation victories were not the only goal 
of the activists who developed disparate impact doctrine.  . . . Disparate impact 
doctrine may be doing important legal work even without substantial numbers of 
litigation victories because its purpose was and is to encourage employers to reflect 
on the possible benefits of choosing employment selection processes that better 
measure the elements of job performance needed for particular positions.”). 
 286. See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2532 (2013) 
(noting, after construing Title VII to require a more stringent standard of causation 
for retaliation claims as opposed to status-based claims, the importance of its 
interpretation to the “fair and responsible allocation of resources” because “claims of 
retaliation are being made with ever-increasing frequency”). 
 287. HUD reports the filing of 10,242, 10,155, and 9354 administrative housing 
discrimination complaints annually for the fiscal years 2009-11; the EEOC reports the 
filing of 93,277, 99,922, and 99,947 charges of employment discrimination for the 
same time period.  U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., FY2011 ANNAUL REPORT ON FAIR 
HOUSING 18 (2011), available at http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/huddoc?id 
=FY2011_annual_rpt_final.pdf; Charge Statistics FY 1997 Through FY 2012, U.S. EQUAL EMP. 
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm 
(last visited Nov. 27, 2013).  
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some might claim that even the possibility of litigation, let alone a 
trial, could deter some risk-averse governmental entities from 
revitalizing predominantly minority neighborhoods.  Yet, disparate 
impact has been an available theory under the FHA for forty years, it 
has been used in housing improvement cases, and it has been 
overwhelmingly unsuccessful.  If governmental entities have been 
slow to revitalize, the disparate impact standard is not the likely cause.  
As shown in Parts II and III, the lower courts have overwhelmingly 
controlled for perverse outcomes in FHA disparate impact cases over 
the past forty years.  Only one housing improvement case had ever 
resulted in a positive decision for plaintiffs on appeal prior to the 
Magner and Mount Holly decisions.288  Only two reversals of summary 
judgments reinstating FHA disparate impact claims had ever 
occurred prior to Magner and Mount Holly, but neither involved 
housing improvement plans.  Whatever one thinks of the Magner and 
Mount Holly fact patterns, the appellate courts’ decision to send these 
fact-intensive challenges to trial is less than audacious.  Some 
members of the Supreme Court might strike the balance differently, 
but this fact alone does not warrant the complete and total 
elimination of the disparate impact theory from the FHA.  The 
Court’s interest in reviewing the validity of the theory based merely 
on a couple of mid-litigation successes for plaintiffs (who may yet lose 
at trial) suggests a zero tolerance for any possible unfairness visited 
on a disparate impact defendant.  In eliminating the FHA disparate 
impact theory, however, the Court would be exhibiting an 
unbounded tolerance for unfairness visited on an unspecified 
number of future plaintiffs, including those challenging exclusionary 
housing barriers that perpetuate racial segregation.  If the Court 
decides, in the next case presented for review, that housing 
improvement plans are inappropriate targets of FHA disparate 
impact theory, it should otherwise preserve the theory. 
As noted in Part IV, a prima facie showing of disparate impact does 
not end the inquiry.289  According to HUD’s regulation, defendants 
will have an opportunity to justify their practices should a prima facie 
case of disparate impact be made.  Defendants will often have an 
                                                          
 288. See supra Part III.B. 
 289. See Langlois v. Abington Hous. Auth., 207 F.3d 43, 49–50 (1st Cir. 2000) 
(“[U]nder statutes like Title VII and Title VIII, merely to show a disparate racial 
impact is normally not enough to condemn:  a vast array of measures, from war-
making and the federal budget to local decisions on traffic and zoning, may have a 
disparate impact.  Thus, practically all of the case law, both in employment and 
housing, treats impact as doing no more than creating a prima facie case, forcing the 
defendant to proffer a valid justification.”). 
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easier time justifying a housing improvement plan as opposed to a 
housing barrier, though the justification must be supported by 
evidence.290  If the housing improvement plan is sufficiently detailed 
to reveal that it furthers the purposes of the FHA by increasing 
housing opportunity and/or integration, plaintiffs may have a 
difficult time establishing the existence of a less discriminatory 
alternative despite the disproportionate displacement of protected 
class members.  To avoid summary judgment, plaintiffs will need to 
offer proof either that the defendant’s revitalization plan is 
illegitimate because it sets the stage for exclusion and/or segregation, 
or its legitimate objectives can be met with less discriminatory effect 
(i.e., less exclusion and/or segregation).  This is a fact intensive 
inquiry, which should be resolved in accordance with the purposes of 
the FHA and in favor of integrated housing.291  If the facts 
demonstrate that the housing improvement plan regardless of intent 
has set the stage for disproportionate exclusion based on a protected 
basis, then a trial rather than summary dismissal may be necessary.  
Requiring some fact-intensive inquiries of disparate impact to be 
tried rather than summarily dismissed is hardly a radical step towards 
achieving integrated housing. 
Third, the disparate treatment standard by itself is an insufficient 
method of proof to capture the policies and practices used to 
maintain racial segregation in the United States.292  Although 
disparate impact challenges are frequently accompanied by disparate 
treatment claims, plaintiffs in many of the important housing barrier 
cases discussed in Part I did not prevail on their discriminatory intent 
claims.293  Specifically, in City of Black Jack, Arlington Heights, and 
Huntington, the plaintiffs prevailed on the FHA disparate impact 
claim alone, with the appellate court not reaching or ruling against 
plaintiffs on the disparate treatment claims.294 
                                                          
 290. See supra note 262 and accompanying text. 
 291. See Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1294 
(7th Cir. 1977) (“[I]f we are to liberally construe the Fair Housing Act, we must 
decide close cases in favor of integrated housing.”). 
 292. Of course, if the Court eliminates FHA disparate impact claims, plaintiffs may 
be able to assert them under state and local laws.  See SCHWEMM, supra note 12, § 30:2 
(“[E]ven if a state or local law’s language mirrors the prohibitions and remedies of 
the Fair Housing Act, state courts are free to interpret that language more broadly 
than its federal counterpart.”). 
 293. See supra Part I (discussing early and more recent FHA disparate impact cases 
involving plaintiffs who attempted to challenge housing barriers using both disparate 
treatment and disparate impact methods of proof).  
 294. See Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 937 
n.7 (2d Cir.) (“Because we hold that we will no longer require a showing of 
discriminatory intent in Title VIII disparate impact claims, we do not review Judge 
Glasser’s findings on intent to discriminate.”), aff’d per curiam, 488 U.S. 15 (1988); 
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To elaborate, community members will frequently express racial 
animus when acting in support of housing barriers.295  However, their 
discriminatory purpose will not always be imputed to public sector 
decision makers.296  As noted by the Fourth Circuit in Smith v. Town of 
Clarkton:297 
Municipal officials acting in their official capacities seldom, if ever, 
announce on the record that they are pursuing a particular course 
of action because of their desire to discriminate against a racial 
minority.  Even individuals acting from invidious motivations 
realize the unattractiveness of their prejudices when faced with 
                                                          
United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1185 n.3 (8th Cir. 1974) (noting, 
despite support in the record for a finding of intent, that “we do not base our 
conclusion that the Black Jack ordinance violates Title VIII on a finding that there 
was an improper purpose”); Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d at 1287 (noting that the court 
had affirmed the district court’s earlier finding that there was no discriminatory 
purpose behind the Village’s refusal to rezone); cf. Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 
564 F.2d 126, 144–45 (3d Cir. 1977) (affirming district court finding that the City of 
Philadelphia was racially motivated in its opposition to a housing project, but not 
making intent finding with respect to the local housing and redevelopment 
authorities).  The Seventh Circuit in Arlington Heights cites Smith v. Anchor Bldg. Corp., 
536 F.2d 231 (8th Cir. 1976), as a discriminatory effects case with insufficient intent 
evidence to support independent relief.  Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d at 1292.  With the 
benefit of several decades of hindsight, Smith reads as a disparate treatment case 
based on circumstantial evidence and citing discriminatory effects cases for added 
support.  Smith, 536 F.2d at 234–36. 
 295. See Huntington Branch, 844 F.2d at 929 (noting that town officials, presumably 
attempting to placate racial opposition, “repeatedly told whites opposing the . . . 
project that they would impose a racial quota on occupancy”); Smith v. Town of 
Clarkton, 682 F.2d 1055, 1062 (4th Cir. 1982) (discussing evidence of a constituent 
statement made off the public record that “he did not want ‘coons either next door 
or in the town’”); see also Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 
U.S. 252, 257–58 (1977) (“Some of the comments, both from opponents and 
supporters, addressed what was referred to as the ‘social issue’ . . . of introducing at 
this location in Arlington Heights low- and moderate-income housing . . . that would 
probably be racially integrated.”); City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d at 1185 n.3 (“Racial 
criticism of Park View Heights was made and cheered at public meetings.”). 
 296. Compare Smith, 682 F.2d at 1066 (“There can be no doubt that the defendants 
knew that a significant portion of the public opposition was racially inspired, and 
their public acts were a direct response to that opposition.”), and United States v. 
City of Parma, 494 F. Supp. 1049, 1083 (N.D. Ohio 1980) (finding that “Parma 
officials, reacting to racial considerations, departed from their normal practices in 
determining to reject the . . . building permit application”), with Metro. Hous. Dev. 
Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 373 F. Supp. 208, 211 (N.D. Ill. 1974) 
(“[Citizens’] motive[s] may well be opposition to minority or low-income groups, at 
least in part, but the circumstantial evidence does not warrant the conclusion that 
this motivated the defendants.  They have zoned 60 tracts for the R-5 use and some 
of it is still vacant and available to plaintiff . . . .”).  See generally Arlington Heights, 558 
F.2d at 1292 (“The bigoted comments of a few citizens, even those with power, 
should not invalidate action which in fact has a legitimate basis.”).  For an example 
of statements made by the public decision maker, rather than community members, 
see Resident Advisory Bd., 564 F.2d at 136 n.14 (“Mayor Rizzo stated that he 
considered public housing to be the same as Black housing . . . [and] therefore felt 
that there should not be any public housing placed in White neighborhoods because 
people in White neighborhoods did not want Black people moving in with them.”).  
 297. 682 F.2d 1055 (4th Cir. 1982). 
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their perpetuation in the public record.  It is only in private 
conversation, with individuals assumed to share their bigotry, that 
open statements of discrimination are made, so it is rare that these 
statements can be captured for purposes of proving racial 
discrimination in a case such as this.298 
Fourth, discriminatory purpose is not always the most pertinent or 
salient area of inquiry when examining housing practices with 
discriminatory effects.  Focusing on the effect of a practice shifts 
focus away from the hearts and minds of decision makers and instead 
on the way in which a current practice tends to perpetuate and 
reinforce old patterns of segregation and exclusion.299  A twenty-first 
century local government bureaucrat or elected official did not 
create racial segregation in housing, but he or she can virtually 
guarantee its perpetuation, with or without discriminatory purpose, 
by simply engaging in practices that help maintain the residential 
status quo.300  This could include not only adopting new rules but also 
enforcing longstanding zoning ordinances that “effectively foreclose 
the construction of any low-cost housing” in an all-white 
neighborhood.301  Officials also can take advantage of facially neutral 
rules that “bear no relation to discrimination upon passage, but 
                                                          
 298. Id. at 1064.  The Smith court ultimately found the evidence sufficient to 
sustain liability under either the effects test or one requiring the showing of 
discriminatory intent.  Id. at 1067.  Of course, discriminatory purpose can be proven 
by circumstantial evidence of the kind described by the Supreme Court in Arlington 
Heights, such as historical background, the particular sequence of events leading up 
to the decision, substantive and procedural departures from normal practice, and 
legislative history. See Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266–68; see also Dews v. Town of 
Sunnyvale, 109 F. Supp. 2d 526, 573 (2000) (concluding that the Town of 
Sunnyvale’s “zoning policies and practices were done with discriminatory intent” 
under the Arlington Heights factors). 
 299. See John Stick, Justifying a Discriminatory Effect Under the Fair Housing Act:  A 
Search for the Proper Standard, 27 UCLA L. REV. 398, 428 (1979) (“[A]ny interpretation 
of Title VIII that renders it ineffective in combating the large proportion of 
segregation attributable to practices not intentionally discriminatory, but 
discriminatory in effect, cannot carry out [Congress’s] legislative intent.”). 
 300. See Huntington Branch, 844 F.2d at 934 (“[A]n intent requirement would strip 
the statute of all impact on de facto segregation”); City of Parma, 494 F. Supp. at 1096 
(“These elected officials were opposed to any action which could change the virtually 
all-white composition of Parma’s neighborhoods.”). 
 301. Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d at 1285, 1292–93 (“If the effect of a zoning scheme 
is to perpetuate segregated housing, neither common sense nor the rationale of the 
Fair Housing Act dictates that the preclusion of minorities in advance should be 
favored over the preclusion of minorities in reaction to a plan which would create 
integration.”(footnote omitted)); see also Dews, 109 F. Supp. 2d at 568 (“There is no 
question that Sunnyvale’s planning and zoning practices as well as its preclusion of 
private construction of multifamily and less costly single-family housing perpetuate 
segregation in a town that is 97 percent white.”); Richard A. Primus, The Future of 
Disparate Impact, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1341, 1347 (“The canonical failure of equal 
protection analysis, after all, was Plessy v. Ferguson’s refusal to understand that a 
formally neutral action might carry a clear meaning about racial hierarchy.”).  
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develop into powerful discriminatory mechanisms when applied.”302  
The most cursory examination of history undermines the proposition 
that the government can ever really be “neutral” on segregation.  
When local governments are not helping to undo segregation, they 
are almost always helping to keep it in place,303 with their actions 
serving as the functional equivalent of intentional discrimination.304 
In contrast to the employment context, in which the Court has 
held that an employer’s structuring of its selection procedures in 
anticipation of disparate impact liability can constitute intentional 
discrimination under Title VII,305 a local government’s consideration 
of its zoning ordinances to ensure that they do not disproportionately 
exclude certain groups should not implicate what Helen Norton has 
described as zero-sum notions of equality.306  Inclusive neighborhoods 
do not “make identifiable third parties worse off in tangible ways.”307 
                                                          
 302. Huntington Branch, 844 F.2d at 935. 
 303. See id. at 941–42 (noting that the town “demonstrated little good faith in 
assisting the development of low-income housing” including “a pattern of stalling” 
such efforts); City of Parma, 494 F. Supp. at 1097 (“Every time Parma was confronted 
with a choice between decisions that would have had an integrative or segregative 
effect, Parma chose the latter.”); Dews, 109 F. Supp. 2d at 568 (“Instead of sharing its 
obligation to provide fair housing, Sunnyvale, by hiding behind its exclusive zoning 
practices, is compelling neighboring communities to assume its obligation.”); see also 
infra notes 314, 316 and accompanying text (rejecting a reading of the Equal 
Protection Clause that would require governmental actors to accept the status quo of 
racial segregation in housing). 
 304. See supra notes 29–40 and accompanying text (demonstrating how neutral 
practices can be as exclusionary as intentional ones, particularly in the context of a 
neutral zoning regulation as challenged in City of Black Jack); cf. Inclusive Cmtys. 
Project, Inc. v. Tex. Dep’t. of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 860 F. Supp. 2d 312, 323–24 
n.19, 331 (N.D. Tex. 2012) (finding that defendant state agency failed to justify 
disparate impact resulting from its disproportionate denial of tax credits to proposed 
developments in Caucasian neighborhoods and citing cases discussing disparate 
impact as functionally equivalent to intentional discrimination). 
 305. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 561–63 (2009).  In Ricci, the New Haven 
Fire Department refused to certify certain promotional examinations because of 
concerns over the validity of the exams, which had a written and oral component, 
and the disparate impact of the exams on African Americans and Latinos.  Id. at 562–
63.  The group who received high scores on the exams claimed that the refusal to use 
the exams because of disparate impact against certain groups constituted intentional 
discrimination against other groups, in violation of both equal protection and Title 
VII.  Id.  The Court ruled only on Title VII grounds, concluding that “race-based 
action like the City’s in this case is impermissible under Title VII unless the employer 
can demonstrate a strong basis in evidence that, had it not taken the action, it would 
have been liable under the disparate-impact statute.  Respondents, we further 
determine, cannot meet that threshold standard.”  Id. at 563.  
 306. See Helen Norton, The Supreme Court’s Post-Racial Turn Towards a Zero-Sum 
Understanding of Equality, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 197, 198 (2010) (arguing against “a 
zero-sum understanding of equality [which, if applied in the constitutional setting] 
would treat a government decision maker’s attention to racial and gender 
hierarchies when choosing among various policy options as inherently suspicious-and 
thus unconstitutional unless the government’s action survives heightened scrutiny”). 
 307. Id. at 258; see also Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 211 (1972) 
(quoting 114 CONG. REC. 2706 (1968) (statement of Sen. Jacob Javits) (referring to 
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In fact, “[m]ost disparate impact remedies avoid creating such 
victims.”308 Even in the prototypical housing improvement scenario, 
assuming it is framed by the purposes of the FHA, the governmental 
entity would consider how to minimize the racially exclusionary 
impact of its revitalization efforts.  This consideration of prospective 
impact might result in less displacement and exclusion of the affected 
group, but not greater exclusion of the non-affected group.309  In this 
way, Mount Holly would be a poor battleground for the “war between 
disparate impact and equal protection” that Justice Scalia warns “will 
be waged sooner or later.”310  Although there are members of the 
Court who believe that any decision making based on a policy’s racial 
outcome “place[s] a racial thumb on the scales” in violation of the 
Equal Protection Clause,311 it is difficult to imagine that five Justices 
would prohibit governmental entities from even considering whether 
their actions perpetuate residential segregation.312  In the analogous 
setting of school desegregation, Justice Kennedy refused to endorse 
the view that “the Constitution requires school districts to ignore the 
problem of de facto resegregation in schooling.”313  Instead, he regards 
the notion that “the Constitution mandates that state and local school 
                                                          
“the whole community” as potential victims of discriminatory housing practices). 
 308. Primus, supra note 301, at 1345 (discussing a “visible victims” reading of Ricci 
that would enable disparate impact doctrine to survive an equal protection challenge 
if it does not disadvantage determinate and visible innocent third parties). 
 309. See SCHWEMM & PRATT, supra note 1, at 24 n.30 (“The FHA has no comparable 
provision [to that in Title VII reflecting a concern about quota-like hiring] and, 
indeed, examples of pro-minority affirmative housing programs have been virtually 
non-existent throughout the FHA’s history.”). 
 310. Ricci, 557 U.S. at 595–96 (Scalia, J., concurring).  Justice Scalia in his 
concurring opinion in the Ricci case warns of the “evil day” when the Court will have 
to confront whether the disparate impact provisions of Title VII are consistent with 
the Equal Protection Clause.  Id. at 594.  It was possible, and even likely, that some 
members of the Court considered Mount Holly a good case for framing disparate 
impact theory in the least desirable way, given its apparent potential to stymie local 
government efforts to eradicate neighborhood blight.  See Primus, supra note 301, at 
1385–86 and n.190 (discussing the importance of framing and suggesting that the 
“victory in warfare often goes to the party who succeeds in maneuvering the fight to 
its chosen ground”).  Nevertheless, the equal protection arguments for destroying 
disparate impact theory seem particularly weak under the FHA.  
 311. Ricci, 557 U.S. at 594 (Scalia, J., concurring).  But see Primus, supra note 301, 
at 1344 (stating that the “general reading” of Ricci, which would render disparate 
impact theory unconstitutional per se because it entails race conscious 
decisionmaking, “is not the only reading available, and it may not be the best one”). 
 312. See Norton, supra note 306, at 212–14  (discussing Justice Kennedy’s 
unwillingness to embrace “easy solutions” in the context of school desegregation, 
and his urging that school authorities remain “free to devise race-conscious measures 
to address the problem in a general way and without treating each student in 
different fashion solely on the basis of a systematic, individual typing by race” 
(quoting Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 788–
89 (2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part))).  
 313. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 788 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part).   
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authorities must accept the status quo of racial isolation in schools,” 
as “profoundly mistaken.”314 
The disparate impact theory, ironically, can be an important tool 
for simply getting government out of the way of efforts to end racial 
segregation in housing.  Accordingly, courts have been particularly 
receptive to disparate impact challenges against government action 
“which interferes with an individual’s plan to use his own land to 
provide integrated housing.”315  Only a strained reading of the FHA 
would suggest that Congress intended to permit unjustified 
governmental interference with its own purpose of opening 
housing markets and creating more balanced living patterns.  An 
equally strained reading of the Equal Protection Clause would 
mandate that governmental actors and others accept the status 
quo of racial isolation in housing.316  As recognized in Arlington, it 
is clear that “[c]onduct that has the necessary and foreseeable 
consequence of perpetuating segregation can be as deleterious as 
purposefully discriminatory conduct in frustrating the national 
commitment to replace the ghettos by truly integrated and 
balanced living patterns.”317 
                                                          
 314. Id.  In the school context, Justice Kennedy would not impose strict scrutiny 
on race conscious mechanisms that “do not lead to different treatment based on a 
classification that tells each student he or she is to be defined by race.”  Id. at 789. 
 315. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1293 
(7th Cir. 1977); see also Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 
F.2d 926, 940–41 (2d Cir.) (“In balancing the showing of discriminatory effect 
against the import of the [defendant’s] justifications, we note our agreement with 
the Seventh Circuit that the balance should be more readily struck in favor of the 
plaintiff when it is seeking only to enjoin a municipal defendant from interfering 
with its own plans rather than attempting to compel the defendant itself to build 
housing.”), aff’d per curiam, 488 U.S. 15 (1988); Smith v. Town of Clarkton, 682 F.2d 
1055, 1065(4th Cir. 1982) (noting that the plaintiff did not seek injunctive relief to 
force the city to build public housing). 
 316. See Barry Goldstein & Patrick O. Patterson, Ricci v. DeStefano:  Does It Herald 
an “Evil Day,” or Does It Lack “Staying Power”?, 40 U. MEM. L. REV. 705, 793–94 (2010) 
(“[E]xamining statutory disparate-impact provisions under the various applicable 
levels of equal protection review may lead to a bizarre world in which the use of a 
disparate-impact standard is permissible for groups that receive lower levels of 
scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause but not for those that receive the highest 
level of scrutiny and therefore are in theory entitled to the most protection—those 
who are discriminated against based on race, national origin, or religion.”).   
 317. Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d at 1289 (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted); see also United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1185 (8th Cir. 
1974) (“[T]he arbitrary quality of thoughtlessness can be as disastrous and unfair to 
private rights and the public interest as the perversity of a willful scheme.” (quoting 
Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 497 (D.D.C. 1967))). 
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CONCLUSION 
After forty years of FHA disparate impact jurisprudence, the 
Supreme Court has decided to review the theory in the exceedingly 
rare context of summary judgment reversals reinstating plaintiffs’ 
claims.  This Article labels these cases, Magner and Mount Holly, 
“housing improvement” cases because they involve disparate impact 
challenges to plans or regulations that purportedly improve housing 
while displacing persons of color at disproportionate rates.  These 
cases may be contrasted with “housing barrier” cases, which involve 
challenges to regulations that perpetuate segregation by preventing 
housing opportunities for minority groups outside of neighborhoods 
where they already live.  Housing barrier cases frequently involve 
removing barriers to neighborhoods that can provide alternatives to 
substandard housing,318 whereas housing improvement cases 
frequently involve preventing displacement from housing alleged to 
be substandard.319  Housing barrier cases promote the highest ideals 
of the FHA, while housing improvement cases meet protected class 
members where they are—in segregated, substandard housing.  
Housing barrier cases help protected class members climb the 
housing ladder to greater opportunity; housing improvement cases 
help prevent protected class members from being pushed down the 
ladder or knocked off altogether in the name of improvement.  
Although disparate impact challenges to housing improvement plans 
can further the purposes of the FHA on the right facts, prior to 
Magner and Mount Holly plaintiffs at the appellate level had only 
succeeded on this type of claim once in the history of the FHA. 
As the quantitative and qualitative analysis of this Article 
demonstrates, the circuit courts first allowing discriminatory effects to 
be used as a method of proof in FHA cases considered the theory in 
the context of housing barrier cases.  The courts recognized the 
broad purpose of the FHA to “replace the ghettos ‘by truly integrated 
and balanced living patterns’”320 and saw FHA disparate impact 
challenges to housing barriers as essential to achieving this purpose.  
                                                          
 318. See Town of Clarkton, 682 F.2d at 1065 (noting, in the context of challenging a 
housing barrier regulation, that the black population was the “population most in 
need of new construction to replace substandard housing”). 
 319. See supra notes 16–17 and accompanying text (describing that challenges to 
housing improvement regulations typically stem from the disproportionate 
impact on minorities displaced by the demolition or rehabilitation of housing 
units); see also supra Part II (reviewing cases involving challenges to housing 
improvement regulations).  
 320. Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 211 (1972) (quoting 114 
CONG. REC. 3422 (1968) (statement of Sen. Walter Mondale)). 
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In the forty years since those earliest housing barrier cases were 
decided, plaintiffs have struggled to obtain and preserve positive 
outcomes using the disparate impact theory.  Yet, the predominant 
type of case considering the FHA disparate impact theory at the 
appellate level remains the housing barrier challenge.  And, not 
surprisingly, housing barrier challenges are the predominant type of 
case among those positive outcomes achieved by plaintiffs at the 
appellate level. 
The relative success of housing barrier challenges using disparate 
impact theory might be explained by the close nexus between these 
claims and the anti-segregation purpose of the FHA.  The disparate 
treatment method of proof will capture only a fraction of housing 
barriers enacted or enforced in a way that perpetuates segregation.  
We have fallen short of achieving Congress’s integration purpose in 
enacting the FHA, even with the disparate impact theory.321  It is 
difficult to imagine how we would fare without it. 
  
                                                          
 321. See Hispanics United of DuPage Cnty. v. Vill. of Addison, 988 F. Supp. 1130, 
1135 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (“The hallmark of a great society—a true racially and ethnically 
integrated community—is an elusive goal that unfortunately still has not been 
achieved in most urban and suburban communities.”). 
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APPENDIX A:  FORTY YEARS OF FHA DISPARATE IMPACT CLAIMS—
REVERSE CHRONOLOGICAL LISTING OF APPELLATE CASES 322 
Case Name Date Ruling 
Keller v. City of Fremont, 
719 F.3d 931 (8th Cir. 
2013) 
June 28 2013 Reversing summary judgment in favor of 
plaintiff landlord on disparate impact 
challenge to ordinance’s rental provisions 
requiring prospective tenants to disclose 
their immigration status and subjecting 
landlord to criminal penalties for 
harboring illegal aliens, based on failure 
to identify a specific disparate impact 
sufficient to establish a prima facie case 
Steed v. EverHome Mortg. 
Co., 477 F. App’x 722 (11th 
Cir. 2012) 
July 11, 2012 Affirming summary judgment dismissing 
disparate impact claim based on failure to 
establish prima facie case
Cinnamon Hills Youth 
Crisis Ctr., Inc. v. Saint 
George City, 685 F.3d 917 
(10th Cir. 2012) 
July 03, 2012 Affirming summary judgment dismissing 
disparate impact claim because residential 
treatment facility challenging zoning 
ordinance “produced no evidence of 
disparate impact.”
Hopkins v. Springfield 
Hous. Auth., 485 F. App’x. 
137 (7th Cir. 2012)  
 
July 02, 2012 Affirming denial of preliminary injunction 
on disparate impact claim challenging 
housing authority policy of inspections 
and subsidy reductions, based on failure to 
demonstrate impact
HDC, LLC v. City of Ann 
Arbor, 675 F.3d 608 (6th 
Cir. 2012) 
Mar. 30, 2012 Affirming dismissal of impact claim 
because of failure to plead sufficient facts 
demonstrating that city’s cancellation of 
option agreement had disparate impact 
against people with disabilities
*Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens 
in Action, Inc. v. Twp. of 
Mount Holly, 658 F.3d 375 
(3d Cir. 2011) 
Sept. 13, 2011 Reversing summary judgment and 
reinstating plaintiffs’ disparate impact 
challenge to a redevelopment plan 
requiring demolition of affordable homes, 
finding that plaintiffs established prima 
facie case of impact on black and Hispanic 
persons and created fact issue on the 
existence of less discriminatory 
alternatives
Greater New Orleans Fair 
Hous. Action Ctr. v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Hous. & Urban 
Dev., 639 F.3d 1078 (D.C. 
Cir. 2011) 
Apr. 08, 2011 Affirming district court’s denial of 
plaintiffs’ first motion for temporary 
restraining order and preliminary 
injunction and reversing granting of 
plaintiffs’ second motions for more 
narrow injunction, finding that data 
offered to show disparate impact of grant 
formula in program designed to help 
homeowners rebuild after hurricanes fell 
short and could not establish likelihood of 
success on the merits
R.J. Invs. LLC v. Bd. of 
Cnty. Comm’rs for Queen 
Anne’s Cnty., 414 F. App’x. 
551 (4th Cir. 2011) 
Mar. 04, 2011 Affirming judgment after trial entered 
against developer plaintiff on disparate 
impact claim challenging county board’s 
refusal to amend its water and sewerage 
plan to permit development
                                                          
 322. Positive outcomes for plaintiffs are designated with an asterisk. 
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Case Name Date Ruling 
Smith v. N.Y.C. Hous. 
Auth., 410 F. App’x 404 (2d 
Cir. 2011) 
Feb. 18, 2011 Affirming dismissal of complaint for 
failure to identify facially neutral policy 
with discriminatory effect against people 
with disabilities
Estate of Davis v. Wells 
Fargo Bank, 633 F.3d 529 
(7th Cir. 2011) 
Jan. 12, 2011 Affirming summary judgment for lack of 
evidence showing defendant’s conduct 
had a racially based disparate impact on 
borrowers
*Gallagher v. Magner, 
619 F.3d 823 (8th Cir. 
2010) 
Sept. 01, 2010 Reversing summary judgment and 
reinstating plaintiff landlords’ disparate 
impact challenge to city’s code 
enforcement scheme for increasing costs 
and decreasing availability of affordable 
housing, finding that plaintiffs established 
prima facie case of racial impact and 
created fact issue on less discriminatory 
alternatives
White Oak Property Dev., 
LLC v. Washington Twp., 
Ohio, 606 F.3d 842 (6th 
Cir. 2010) 
June 04, 2010 Affirming summary judgment in favor of 
township on disparate impact claim based 
on developer’s presenting “no evidence” 
of possible racial impact of prohibition of 
multi-family dwellings
Quad Enters. Co., LLC v. 
Town of Southold, 369 F. 
App’x. 202 (2d Cir 2010) 
Mar. 10, 2010 Affirming summary judgment against 
developer of senior housing for 
inadequate showing of disparate impact of 
density and multifamily zoning restrictions 
on the basis of disability
Ungar v. N.Y.C. Hous. 
Auth., 363 F. App’x. 53 (2d 
Cir. 2010) 
Jan. 26, 2010 Affirming summary judgment against 
plaintiffs for lack of showing that public 
housing authority tenant selection and 
assignment plan had disparate impact on 
orthodox Jew
Massbaum v. WNC Mgmt., 
361 F. App’x. 904 (9th Cir. 
2010) 
Jan. 11, 2010 Affirming summary judgment on disparate 
impact claim based on failure of proof; 
claim not discernible 
Artisan/Am. Corp. v. City of 
Alvin, 588 F.3d 291 (5th 
Cir. 2009) 
Nov. 13, 2009 Affirming summary judgment based on 
inadequate showing of discriminatory 
impact in denial of permit for tax credit 
housing pursuant to spacing ordinance; 
most of low income housing units in 
county located in city of Alvin 
*Comm. Concerning Cmty. 
Improvement v. City of 
Modesto, 583 F.3d 690 (9th 
Cir. 2009) 
Oct. 8, 2009 Reversing dismissal of FHA disparate 
impact claim based on summary judgment 
evidence regarding timely provision of law 
enforcement personnel; affirming 
dismissal on provision of sewer services 
and infrastructure
Bonasera v. City of 
Norcross, 342 F. App’x. 581 
(11th Cir. 2009) 
Aug. 21, 2009 Affirming summary judgment dismissing 
disparate impact claim that selective 
enforcement of zoning ordinance created 
disparate impact on Hispanic persons, 
based on insufficient evidence; claim 
centered on enforcement and not facially 
neutral ordinance itself
Green v. Cal. Court 
Apartments LLC, 321 F. 
App’x. 589 (9th Cir. 2009) 
Apr. 2, 2009 Affirming summary judgment dismissing 
disparate treatment and disparate impact 
claims against rental apartments for 
failure to raise triable issues
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Case Name Date Ruling 
Schwarz v. City of Treasure 
Island, 544 F.3d 1201 (11th 
Cir. 2008) 
Oct. 8, 2008 Affirming summary judgment dismissing 
halfway house disparate impact challenge 
to occupancy turnover rule, based on lack 
of prima facie evidence
Greengael, LC v. Bd. of 
Superiors of Culpeper 
Cnty., 313 F. App’x. 577 
(4th Cir. 2008) 
Sept. 5, 2008 Affirming grant of summary judgment 
under FHA for lack of evidence of racially 
discriminatory effect of zoning change 
Khalil v. Farash Corp., 277 
F. App’x. 81 (2d Cir. 2008) 
May 7, 2008 Affirming summary judgment dismissing 
disparate impact challenge to lease rule 
based on familial status for failure to 
establish prima facie case 
Budnick v. Town of 
Carefree, 518 F.3d 1109 
(9th Cir. 2008) 
Mar. 11, 2008 Affirming summary judgment dismissing 
disability-based disparate impact challenge 
to permitting practices for lack of 
evidence
Wadley v. Park at 
Landmark, LP, 264 F. 
App’x. 279, (4th Cir. 2008) 
Feb. 12, 2008 Affirming summary judgment dismissing 
FHA claim based on lack of evidence of 
intent and impact regarding enactment of 
section 8 non-renewal policy
Graoch Assocs. # 33, L.P. v. 
Louisville/Jefferson Cnty. 
Metro Human Relations 
Comm’n, 508 F.3d 366 (6th 
Cir. 2007) 
Nov. 21, 2007 Affirming summary judgment dismissal of 
disparate impact claim challenging 
landlord withdrawal from Section 8 
program for failure to state prima facie 
case, after finding that disparate impact 
applied to such claims
Bonvillian v. Lawler-Wood 
Hous., LLC, 242 F. App’x. 
159 (5th Cir. 2007) 
July 13, 2007 Affirming summary judgment dismissing 
disparate impact claim challenging post-
Katrina apartment building closure for 
failure to show prima facie impact
Reinhart v. Lincoln Cnty, 
482 F.3d 1225 (10th Cir. 
2007) 
Apr. 9, 2007 Affirming summary judgment dismissing 
disparate impact claim challenging land 
use regulations for lack of proper prima 
facie proof
Hallmark Developers, Inc. 
v. Fulton Cnty., 466 F.3d 
1276 (11th Cir. 2006) 
Oct. 12, 2006 Affirming judgment following bench trial 
dismissing disparate impact challenge to 
refusal to re-zone property for low and 
moderate income housing; district court 
had denied summary judgment on the 
claim
2922 Sherman Ave. 
Tenants’ Ass’n v. District of 
Columbia, 444 F.3d 673 
(D.C. Cir. 2006) 
Apr. 14, 2006 Reversing jury verdict favoring tenants on 
FHA disparate impact claim, and 
reinstating intent claim, finding evidence 
insufficient to support claim that initiative 
targeting buildings in Hispanic 
neighborhoods for closure disparately 
affected Hispanic tenants 
Affordable Hous. Dev. 
Corp. v. City of Fresno, 433 
F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 2006) 
Jan. 11, 2006 Affirming jury verdict in favor of city on 
defense to disparate impact claim 
challenging denial of bond issue for low-
income apartment complex; defense to 
disparate impact defeated jury’s other 
finding of prima facie case of impact 
Cmty. Servs. Inc. v. Wind 
Gap Mun. Auth., 421 F.3d 
170 (3d Cir. 2005) 
Aug. 31, 2005 Reversing summary judgment in favor of 
plaintiff service provider for people with 
disabilities on disparate impact claim 
based on erroneous determination on 
disparate treatment claim
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Case Name Date Ruling 
*Charleston Hous. Auth. v. 
U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 419 
F.3d 729 (8th Cir. 2005) 
Aug. 18, 2005 Affirming trial court ruling in favor of 
plaintiffs on disparate impact challenge to 
housing authority revitalization plan 
calling for demolition of low income 
rental units, but remanding for 
reconsideration of injunctive relief 
ordering re-occupancy of apartments 
Darst-Webbe Tenant Ass’n 
Bd. v. St. Louis Hous. Auth., 
417 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 
2005) 
Aug. 8, 2005 After assuming plaintiffs’ prima facie case 
of disparate impact was demonstrated, 
affirming trial court findings that 
defendant housing authority justified any 
disparate impact resulting from public 
housing redevelopment plan with 
legitimate objectives and plaintiff failed to 
demonstrate that alternative plan would 
meet objectives while reducing disparate 
impact
*Meyer v. Bear Rd. Assocs., 
124 F. App’x. 686 (2d Cir. 
2005) 
Mar. 7, 2005 Reversing dismissal of disparate impact 
claim challenging rental pricing policy 
charging more for groups over four on the 
basis of familial status
Tsombanidis v. W. Haven 
Fire Dep’t, 352 F.3d 565 
(2d Cir. 2003) 
Dec. 15, 2003 Reversing bench trial ruling that fire code 
had disparate impact on people with 
disabilities, finding that plaintiffs failed to 
establish prima facie case
Koorn v. Lacey Twp., 78 F. 
App’x. 199 (3d Cir. 2003) 
Oct. 17, 2003 Affirming summary judgment dismissing 
disparate impact and other claims 
challenging animal control ordinance for 
lack of evidence of racial effects
Oti Kaga, Inc. v. S.D. Hous. 
Dev. Auth., 342 F.3d 871 
(8th Cir. 2003) 
Sept. 15, 2003 Affirming summary judgment dismissing 
disparate impact claim challenging state 
policy of distributing housing funds, based 
on failure to demonstrate effective 
alternative policy without discriminatory 
effects 
Hartman v. Greenwich 
Walk Homeowners’ Ass’n 
Inc., 71 F. App’x. 135 (3d 
Cir. 2003) 
Aug. 4, 2003 Affirming summary judgment dismissing 
disparate impact challenge to 
condominium association policy requiring 
request for variance from association 
rules, based on lack of evidence
Good Shepherd Manor 
Found. Inc. v. City of 
Momence, 323 F.3d 557 
(7th Cir. 2003) 
Mar. 24, 2003 Affirming refusal to instruct jury on 
disparate impact because of deficient 
instruction and theory’s inapplicability to 
particular facts relating to housing for 
people with disabilities
Fair Hous. in Huntington 
Comm. Inc. v. Town of 
Huntington, 316 F.3d 357 
(2d Cir. 2003) 
Jan. 17, 2003 Affirming denial of preliminary injunction 
against construction of age-restricted 
development; town’s practice of 
concentrating family housing in racially 
segregated areas and age-restricted 
housing in white areas alleged to have 
disparate impact and perpetuate 
segregation
Patel v. City of L.A., 47 F. 
App’x. 799 (9th Cir. 2002) 
Aug. 8, 2002 Affirming dismissal of complaints alleging 
disparate impact of city’s finding that 
hotels were public nuisances, based on 
lack of allegations of discriminatory effect 
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Case Name Date Ruling 
Omni Behavioral Health v. 
Miller, 285 F.3d 646 (8th 
Cir. 2002) 
Apr. 2, 2002 Affirming summary judgment dismissing 
FHA disparate impact claim challenging 
investigation of child abuse allegations 
against group home, which resulted in 
closure of home for predominantly 
minority and disabled children; concern 
about child abuse was legitimate 
justification for investigation
Lapid-Laurel, L.L.C. v. 
Zoning Bd., 284 F.3d 442 
(3d Cir. 2002) 
Mar. 15, 2002 Affirming summary judgment dismissing 
disparate impact challenge to land use 
regime regarding senior housing for 
failure to establish prima facie case 
Rekhter v. Cent. Park E. 
Ltd. P’ship, Kauri Invs. Ltd., 
31 F. App’x. 506 (9th Cir. 
2002) 
Mar. 13, 2002 Affirming summary judgment dismissing 
disparate impact challenge of Section 8 
certificate holder to short-term lease 
policy for lack of evidence
Reg’l Econ. Cmty. Action 
Program, Inc. v. City of 
Middletown, 294 F.3d 35 
(2d Cir. 2002) 
Feb. 19, 2002 Affirming summary judgment dismissing 
disparate impact challenge to denial of 
special use permit for housing for people 
with disabilities as inapplicable theory; 
reversing summary judgment as to intent 
and retaliation claims 
Macone v. Town of 
Wakefield, 277 F.3d 1 (1st 
Cir. 2002) 
Jan. 10, 2002 Affirming summary judgment dismissing 
disparate impact challenge to rescinding 
of support for low income housing project 
for failure to establish prima facie case 
McZeal v. Ocwen Fin. 
Corp., 252 F.3d 1355 (5th 
Cir. 2001) 
Mar. 28, 2001 Affirming dismissal of complaint for 
failure to adequately plead FHA disparate 
impact claim against holder of note 
secured by home
Hack v. President & Fellows 
of Yale Coll.,237 F.3d 81 
(2d Cir. 2000) 
Dec. 28, 2000 Affirming dismissal of complaint alleging 
disparate impact and other claims based 
on failure to allege that Yale’s on campus 
housing requirement resulted in under-
representation of Orthodox Jews in Yale 
housing, a pleading standard later 
abrogated by Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, N.A., 
534 U.S. 506 (2002)
Veles v. Lindow, 243 F.3d 
552 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(unpublished table 
decision) 
Nov. 1, 2000 Affirming jury verdict dismissing disparate 
impact claim challenging rental policy 
requiring at least one adult member to 
speak fluent English for lack of evidence 
and failure to object to exclusion of 
statistical evidence
Fair Hous. Advocates Ass’n, 
Inc. v. City of Richmond 
Heights, 209 F.3d 626 (6th 
Cir. 2000) 
Apr. 13, 2000 Affirming judgment following bench trial 
dismissing disparate impact claim 
challenging occupancy standards as 
discriminating against families with 
children
Langlois v. Abington Hous. 
Auth., 207 F.3d 43 (1st Cir. 
2000) 
Mar. 27, 2000 Ruling against plaintiffs on disparate 
impact claim challenging local residency 
preferences in distributing section 8 
vouchers, but remanding for 
determination of whether preliminary 
injunction could be upheld on other 
grounds
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Case Name Date Ruling 
Catanzaro v. Weiden, 188 
F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 1999) 
July 28, 1999 On rehearing, affirming summary 
judgment dismissing disparate impact 
claim challenging demolition of two 
buildings for failure to demonstrate 
discriminatory effect of overall city 
housing policies
Jersey Heights 
Neighborhood Ass’n v. 
Glendening, 174 F.3d 180 
(4th Cir. 1999) 
Apr. 5, 1999 Affirming dismissal of fair housing claims 
challenging highway site-selection process 
Caractor v. Town of 
Hempstead, 159 F.3d 1345 
(2d Cir. 1998) 
(unpublished table 
decision) 
June 11, 1998 Affirming summary judgment dismissing 
disparate impact claim challenging rental 
rates set for section 8 program landlords 
as racially discriminatory 
Barklage v. City of San 
Bernadino, 142 F.3d 442 
(9th Cir. 1998) 
(unpublished table 
decision) 
Apr. 16, 1998 Affirming summary judgment on disparate 
impact claim challenging zoning 
ordinance and action on application for 
an amendment and conditional use 
permit to operate residential facility for 
recovering addicts, based on lack of 
evidence
Salute v. Stratford Greens 
Garden Apartments, 136 
F.3d 293 (2d Cir. 1998) 
Feb. 5, 1998 Affirming summary judgment dismissal of 
disability-based disparate impact claim 
challenging landlord’s refusal to accept 
section 8 program participants because 
non-participation was legitimate reason to 
refuse tenants
*Gilligan v. Jamco Dev. 
Corp., 108 F.3d 246 (9th 
Cir. 1997) 
Mar. 5, 1997 Reversing dismissal of disparate treatment 
and disparate impact claims for failure to 
plead prima facie case; pleading of 
financial qualification not necessary for 
disparate impact challenge to policy 
refusing rental to AFDC recipients 
Gamble v. City of 
Escondido, 104 F.3d 300 
(9th Cir. 1997) 
Jan. 10, 1997 Affirming summary judgment dismissing 
disparate impact claim challenging denial 
of conditional use permit to construct 
housing for physically disabled, elderly 
adults, based on inadequate impact 
evidence
Williams v. 5300 Columbia 
Pike Corp., 103 F.3d 122 
(4th Cir. 2006) 
(unpublished table 
decision) 
Dec. 3, 1996 (Affirming summary judgment against 
disparate impact challenge to 
condominium conversion plan; refusing 
to apply disparate impact when alleged 
injury is solely product of facially neutral 
price
Pfaff v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. 
& Urban Dev., 88 F.3d 739 
(9th Cir. 1996) 
July 2, 1996 Reversing HUD ALJ finding of disparate 
impact of neutral occupancy restriction 
against families with children; compelling 
business standard arbitrary as applied 
given less stringent reasonableness 
standard previously applied to reasonable 
occupancy cases
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Ng v. Quiet Forest II 
Homeowners Ass’n, 87 F.3d 
1321 (9th Cir. 1996) 
(unpublished table 
decision) 
June 19, 1996 Affirming summary judgment dismissing 
challenge to condominium rules requiring 
participation of unit owners and 
prohibiting rental of units for two years, 
based on lack of evidence of 
discriminatory purpose or impact on a 
statutorily protected class
Simms v. First Gibraltar 
Bank, 83 F.3d 1546 (5th 
Cir. 1996) 
May 31, 1996 Reversing jury finding of disparate impact 
of bank’s refusal to issue a commitment 
letter based on predicted race of 
cooperative housing owners, because 
disparate impact claim cannot be based on 
“single act or decision
Carlson v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Hous. & Urban Dev., 81 
F.3d 165 (8th Cir. 1996) 
(unpublished table 
decision)  
Apr. 5, 1996 Reversing HUD ALJ finding of disparate 
impact of neutral occupancy restriction of 
three persons per unit against families 
with children; record did not support the 
existence of such a restriction)
Mountain Side Mobile 
Estates P’ship v. Sec’y of 
Hous. & Urban Dev., 56 
F.3d 1243 (10th Cir. 1995) 
May 30, 1995 Reversing HUD Secretary decision finding 
three-person occupancy limit in mobile 
home park as having disparate impact, 
based on adequate showing of business 
necessity
Knapp v. Eagle Prop. Mgmt. 
Corp., 54 F.3d 1272 (7th 
Cir. 1995) 
May 17, 1995 Affirming jury verdict against plaintiff on 
fair housing disparate impact claim and 
trial court’s exclusion of expert witness, 
based on refusal to apply disparate impact 
to non-acceptance of section 8 housing 
vouchers
Armendariz v. Penman, 31 
F.3d 860 (9th Cir. 1994) 
Aug. 1, 1994 Reversing denial of summary judgment 
(where qualified immunity defense was 
raised) and dismissing FHA claim 
challenging closure of low income 
housing units in series of code 
enforcement sweeps as having disparate 
impact on minorities; no proper showing 
of impact made, nor showing of 
discriminatory intent
*Jackson v. Okaloosa Cnty., 
Fla., 21 F.3d 1531 (11th Cir. 
1994) 
June 8, 1994 Reversing dismissal of complaint alleging 
policy governing site approval had effect 
of excluding African American public 
housing residents from unincorporated 
area of county and perpetuated 
segregation 
Orange Lake Assocs. Inc. v. 
Kirkpatrick, 21 F.3d 1214 
(2d Cir. 1994) 
Apr. 14, 1994 Affirming summary judgment on FHA 
disparate impact challenge to zoning 
change from 12 units per acre [R-3] to 2 
units per acre [R-2] based on insufficient 
allegations and proof
Boodram v. Md. Farms 
Condo., 16 F.3d 408 (4th 
Cir. 1994) 
Feb. 1, 1994 Affirming summary judgment on religion-
based disparate impact challenge to 
condominium association rule prohibiting 
balcony storage for insufficient evidence; 
no showing that religious articles could 
not be stored inside or that rule bore 
more harshly on plaintiff’s Hindu religion 
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*U.S. v. Badgett, 976 F.2d 
1176 (8th Cir. 1992) 
Oct. 9, 1992 Reversing district court ruling against 
plaintiff after trial dismissing FHA 
challenge to neutral one-person 
occupancy limit, finding that disparate 
impact against families with children not 
justified
S.-Suburban Hous. Ctr. v. 
Greater S. Suburban Bd. of 
Realtors, 935 F.2d 868 (7th 
Cir. 1991) 
June 19, 1991 Affirming bench trial decision against 
realtors who brought FHA challenge to 
certain anti-solicitation ordinances as 
having a disparate impact on black home 
seekers and remanding fair housing 
challenge to “for sale” sign ban
Familystyle of St. Paul, Inc. 
v. City of St. Paul, 923 F.2d 
91 (8th Cir. 1991) 
Jan. 8, 1991 Affirming summary judgment dismissal of 
disparate impact challenge to state law 
and zoning code requiring dispersal of 
group homes for people with mental 
disabilities as justified by legitimate goal of 
deinstitutionalization
Funk v. Loyalty Enters. Ltd., 
921 F.2d 279 (9th Cir. 
1990) (unpublished table 
decision) 
Dec. 28, 1990 Affirming summary judgment dismissing 
white applicant’s disparate impact 
challenge to first come, first served policy 
for lack of sufficient evidence of racially 
discriminatory effect
Vill. of Bellwood v. Dwivedi, 
895 F.2d 1521 (7th Cir. 
1990) 
Jan. 30, 1990 Reversing jury verdict for plaintiff based 
on discriminatory effect instruction, 
finding the disparate impact method 
inapplicable to racial steering cases 
*Doe v. City of Butler, 892 
F.2d 315 (3d Cir. 1989) 
Dec. 29, 1989 Affirming summary judgment dismissing 
disparate impact challenge by those 
seeking shelter for domestic violence to 
ordinance limiting number of occupants 
in transitional dwellings, based on failure 
to establish impact on women, but 
remanding for consideration of impact on 
familial status
Edwards v. Johnston Cnty. 
Health Dep’t, 885 F.2d 
1215 (4th Cir. 1989) 
Sept. 20, 1989 Affirming dismissal of claim challenging 
permitting of substandard migrant 
farmworker housing for failure to plead 
racially discriminatory effect
Nickell v. Montgomery 
Cnty. 878 F.2d 379 (4th Cir. 
1989) (unpublished table 
decision) 
June 20, 1989 Affirming summary judgment dismissing 
disparate impact challenge to zoning 
ordinance eliminating “noncomplying” 
multifamily uses and reverting to single 
family zones, based on failure to 
demonstrate racially disparate impact on 
existing renters
Gomez v. Chody, 867 F.2d 
395 (7th Cir. 1989) 
Jan. 31, 1989 Affirming summary judgment dismissing 
disparate impact challenge to 
rehabilitation of apartments declared 
public nuisance resulting in displacement 
of tenants who were 95% Hispanic and 
60% of Hispanic population in area; 
building would be rehabilitated and at 
least 51% of the apartments occupied by 
low or moderate income persons
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*Keith v. Volpe, 858 F.2d 
467 (9th Cir. 1988) 
Sept. 19, 1988 Affirming bench trial decision enjoining 
refusal to permit construction of two 
housing projects for people displaced by 
freeway construction, based on disparate 
impact of refusal and inadequate 
justifications
*Huntington Branch, 
NAACP v. Town of 
Huntington, 844 F.2d 926 
(2d Cir. 1988) 
Apr. 5, 1988 Reversing bench trial decision against 
plaintiffs on disparate impact claim, 
finding that refusal to amend ordinance 
and rezone site to allow multifamily 
housing to be constructed outside of a 
racially segregated urban renewal area had 
a substantial adverse impact on minorities 
and perpetuated segregation in violation 
of the FHA
Burrell v. City of Kankakee, 
815 F.2d 1127 (7th Cir. 
1987) 
Apr. 6, 1987 Affirming judgment after trial dismissing 
FHA disparate impact challenge to delay 
in processing section 8 Housing Assistance 
Payment contracts, based on lack of 
evidence of discriminatory effect on 
availability of housing to minorities and 
evidence of concern about undue 
concentration of assisted housing in first 
ward
Hanson v. Veterans Admin., 
800 F.2d 1381 (5th Cir. 
1986) 
Sept. 29, 1986 Affirming district court ruling against 
plaintiff after trial on disparate impact 
challenge to VA appraisal practices, 
finding that trial court was entitled to find 
evidence insufficient to establish racially 
based negative impact on home values in 
racially mixed neighborhood
Latinos Unidos De Chelsea 
En Accion v. Sec’y of Hous. 
& Urban Dev., 799 F.2d 774 
(1st Cir. 1986) 
Aug. 12, 1986 Affirming bench trial ruling against 
plaintiffs on disparate impact challenge to 
city’s funding of housing improvement 
program for focus on homeownership, 
based on failure to establish prima case of 
impact
Arthur v. City of Toledo, 
782 F.2d 565 (6th Cir. 
1986) 
Jan. 24, 1986 Affirming bench trial decision against 
plaintiffs on disparate impact challenge to 
referenda repealing ordinances granting 
authority to construct sewer extensions to 
two proposed public housing sites, where 
comparable housing in white 
neighborhoods eventually built 
Southend Neighborhood 
Imp. Ass’n v. St. Clair Cnty., 
743 F.2d 1207 (7th Cir. 
1984) 
Sept. 17, 1984 Dismissing FHA disparate impact claim 
after district court stayed for lack of 
jurisdiction, finding that county’s alleged 
failure to maintain tax delinquent 
properties in black neighborhoods not 
shown to violate FHA based on damage to 
neighboring properties
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*Betsey v. Turtle Creek 
Assocs. 736 F.2d 983 (4th 
Cir. 1984) 
June 18, 1984 Reversing bench trial decision against 
plaintiffs on disparate impact claim 
challenging building-wide evictions 
pursuant to new all-adult rental policy, 
finding that plaintiffs established prima 
facie case based on evidence that 54.3% of 
nonwhite tenants received eviction 
notices, as opposed to 14.1% of white 
tenants
*Smith v. Town of Clarkton, 
682 F.2d 1055 (4th Cir. 
1982) 
June 29, 1982 Affirming bench trial decision finding 
FHA disparate impact liability based on 
town’s withdrawal from multi-municipality 
housing authority, effectively blocking 
construction of 50 units of public housing 
*Halet v. Wend Inv. Co., 
672 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 
1982) 
Jan. 25, 1982 Reversing dismissal of FHA race-based 
disparate impact challenge to an adults-
only rental policy at pleading stage, 
finding allegations sufficient to state a 
claim
*United States v. City of 
Parma, 661 F.2d 562 (6th 
Cir. 1981) 
Oct. 14, 1981 Affirming bench trial decision finding 
four land use ordinances to have 
discriminatory effect in violation of FHA 
and constituting part of a number of acts 
having “the purpose and effect of 
maintaining Parma as a segregated 
community”
*Resident Advisory Bd. v. 
Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126 (3d Cir. 
1977) 
Aug. 31, 1977 Affirming bench trial decision finding 
disparate impact of local government 
entities’ urban renewal activities in 
removing black families from the urban 
renewal area, leaving the area as an all-
white community, and terminating the 
planned public housing project thereafter; 
although the court did not adopt the 
district court’s “compelling interest” 
formulation for determining defendants’ 
burden of justification, defendants offered 
no justification to overcome plaintiffs’ 
prima facie case 
*Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. 
Vill. of Arlington Heights, 
558 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 
1977) 
July 7, 1977 On remand from Supreme Court, holding 
FHA violation could be found where 
refusal to rezone property to permit 
construction of federally financed low-cost 
housing had discriminatory effect and 
perpetuated segregation in the “almost 
totally white” village of Arlington Heights; 
remanding to district court to determine 
FHA violation
*United States v. City of 
Black Jack, Mo., 508 F.2d 
1179 (8th Cir. 1974) 
Dec. 27, 1974 Reversing district court finding of no 
discriminatory effect, finding FHA 
violation because of discriminatory effect 
of zoning ordinance prohibiting 
construction of any new multi-family 
housing and excluding proposed low-
income integrated townhouse 
development in virtually all-white 
community
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APPENDIX B:  FORTY YEARS OF FHA DISPARATE IMPACT CLAIMS—
LISTING OF APPELLATE CASES BY CASE TYPE323 
Housing Barrier 
 R.J. Invs., L.L.C. v. Bd. of Cnty. Com’rs For Queen Anne’s Cnty., 414 
F. App’x. 551, (4th Cir. 2011) 
 White Oak Prop. Dev., LLC v. Washington Twp., 606 F.3d (6th Cir. 
2010) 
 Artisan/American Corp. v. City of Alvin, 588 F.3d 291, (5th Cir. 
2009) 
 Greengael, LC v. Bd. of Superiors of Culpeper Cnty., 313 F. App’x. 
577, (4th Cir. 2008) 
 Reinhart v. Lincoln Cnty, 482 F.3d 1225 (10th Cir. 2007) 
 Hallmark Developers, Inc. v. Fulton Cnty., 466 F.3d 1276 (11th Cir. 
2006) 
 Affordable Hous. Dev. Corp. v. City of Fresno, 433 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 
2006) 
 Macone v. Town of Wakefield, 277 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2002) 
 *Jackson v. Okaloosa Cnty., 21 F.3d 1531 (11th Cir. 1994) 
 Orange Lake Assocs., Inc. v. Kirkpatrick, 21 F.3d 1214 (2d Cir. 1994) 
 *Keith v. Volpe, 858 F.2d 467 (9th Cir. 1988) 
 *Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926 
(2d Cir. 1988) 
 Burrell v. City of Kankakee, 815 F.2d 1127 (7th Cir. 1987) 
 Arthur v. City of Toledo, 782 F.2d 565 (6th Cir. 1986) 
 *Smith v. Town of Clarkton, 682 F.2d 1055 (4th Cir. 1982) 
 *United States v. City of Parma, 661 F.2d 562 (6th Cir. 1981) 
 *Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126 (3d Cir. 1977) 
 *Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283 
(7th Cir. 1977) 
 *United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974) 
Housing Improvement 
 *Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc. v. Twp. of Mount Holly, 
658 F.3d 375 (3d Cir. 2011) 
 *Gallagher v. Magner, 619 F.3d 823 (8th Cir. 2010) 
 Bonasera v. City of Norcross, 342 F. App’x. 581 (11th Cir. 2009) 
 Bonvillian v. Lawler-Wood Hous., LLC, 242 F. App’x. 159 (5th Cir. 
2007) 
                                                          
 323. Positive outcomes for plaintiffs are designated with an asterisk. 
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 2922 Sherman Ave. Tenants’ Ass’n v. District of Columbia, 444 F.3d 
673 (D.C. Cir. 2006) 
 *Charleston Hous. Auth. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 419 F.3d 729 (8th 
Cir. 2005) 
 Darst-Webbe Tenant Ass’n Bd. v. St. Louis Hous. Auth., 417 F.3d 898 
(8th Cir. 2005) 
 Koorn v. Lacey Twp., 78 F. App’x. 199 (3d Cir. 2003) 
 Patel v. City of L.A., 47 F. App’x. 799 (9th Cir. 2002) 
 Catanzaro v. Weiden, 188 F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 1999) 
 Armendariz v. Penman, 31 F.3d 860 (9th Cir. 1994) 
 Nickell v. Montgomery Cnty., 878 F.2d 379 (4th Cir. 1989) 
(unpublished table decision) 
 Gomez v. Chody, 867 F.2d 395 (7th Cir. 1989) 
 Omni Behavioral Health v. Miller, 285 F.3d 646 (8th Cir. 2002) 
People with Disabilities 
 Cinnamon Hills Youth Crisis Center, Inc. v. Saint George City, 685 
F.3d 917 (10th Cir. 2012) 
 HDC, LLC v. City of Ann Arbor, 675 F.3d 608 (6th Cir. 2012) 
 Quad Enters. Co., LLC v. Town of Southold, 369 F. App’x. 202 (2d 
Cir. 2010) 
 Schwarz v. City of Treasure Island, 544 F.3d 1201 (11th Cir. 2008) 
 Budnick v. Town of Carefree, 518 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2008) 
 Cmty. Servs., Inc. v. Wind Gap Mun. Auth., 421 F.3d 170 (3d Cir. 
2005) 
 Tsombanidis v. W. Haven Fire Dep’t, 352 F.3d 565 (2d Cir. 2003) 
 Good Shepherd Manor Found., Inc. v. City of Momence, 323 F.3d 
557 (7th Cir. 2003) 
 Lapid-Laurel, L.L.C. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 284 F.3d 442 (3d 
Cir. 2002)  
 Reg’l Econ. Cmty. Action Program, Inc. v. City of Middletown, 294 
F.3d 35 (2d Cir. 2002) 
 Barklage v. City of San Bernadino, 142 F.3d 442 (9th Cir. 1998) 
(unpublished table decision) 
 Salute v. Stratford Greens Garden Apartments, 136 F.3d 293 (2d Cir. 
1998) 
 Gamble v. City of Escondido, 104 F.3d 300 (9th Cir. 1997) 
 Familystyle of St. Paul, Inc. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 923 F.2d 91 (8th 
Cir. 1991) 
Rental Policies 
 Keller v. City of Fremont, 719 F.3d 931 (8th Cir. 2013) 
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 Green v. Cal. Court Apartments LLC, 321 F. App’x. 589 (9th Cir. 
2009) 
 Wadley v. Park at Landmark, LP, 264 F. App’x. 279 (4th Cir. 2008) 
 Graoch Assocs. # 33, L.P. v. Louisville/Jefferson Cnty. Metro Human 
Relations Comm’n, 508 F.3d 366 (6th Cir. 2007) 
 Rekhter v. Cent. Park E. Ltd. P’ship, 31 F. App’x. 506 (9th Cir. 2002) 
 Hack v. President & Fellows of Yale Coll., 237 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2000) 
 Veles v. Lindow, 243 F.3d 552 (9th Cir. 2000) (unpublished table 
decision) 
 *Gilligan v. Jamco Dev. Corp., 108 F.3d 246 (9th Cir. 1997) 
 Knapp v. Eagle Prop. Mgmt. Corp., 54 F.3d 1272 (7th Cir. 1995) 
 Funk v. Loyalty Enters., Ltd., 921 F.2d 279 (9th Cir. 1990) 
(unpublished table decision) 
Familial Status 
 Khalil v. Farash Corp., 277 F. App’x. 81 (2d Cir. 2008) 
 *Meyer v. Bear Rd. Assocs., 124 F. App’x. 686 (2d Cir. 2005) 
 Fair Hous. Advocates Ass’n, Inc. v. City of Richmond Heights, 209 
F.3d 626 (6th Cir. 2000) 
 Pfaff v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 88 F.3d 739 (9th Cir. 
1996) 
 Carlson v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 81 F.3d 165 (8th Cir. 
1996) 
 Mountain Side Mobile Estates P’ship v. Sec’y of Hous. & Urban Dev., 
56 F.3d 1243 (10th Cir. 1995) 
 *United States v. Badgett, 976 F.2d 1176 (8th Cir. 1992) 
 *Doe v. City of Butler, 892 F.2d 315 (3d Cir. 1989) 
 *Betsey v. Turtle Creek Assocs., 736 F.2d 983 (4th Cir. 1984) 
 *Halet v. Wend Inv. Co., 672 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1982)  
Lending/Appraisal 
 Steed v. EverHome Mortg. Co., 477 F. App’x. 722 (11th Cir. 2012) 
 Estate of Davis v. Wells Fargo Bank, 633 F.3d 529 (7th Cir. 2011) 
 Steed v. EverHome Mortg. Co., 308 F. App’x. 364 (11th Cir. 2009)  
 McZeal v. Ocwen Fin. Corp., 252 F.3d 1355 (5th Cir. 2001) 
 Simms v. First Gibraltar Bank, 83 F.3d 1546 (5th Cir. 1996) 
 Hanson v. Veterans Admin., 800 F.2d 1381 (5th Cir. 1986) 
Housing Authority 
 Hopkins v. Springfield Hous. Auth., 485 F. App’x. 137 (7th Cir. 2012) 
 Smith v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 410 F. App’x. 404 (2d Cir. 2011) 
 Ungar v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 363 F. App’x. 53 (2d Cir. 2010) 
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 Langlois v. Abington Hous. Auth., 207 F.3d 43 (1st Cir. 2000) 
 Caractor v. Town of Hempstead, 159 F.3d 1345 (2d Cir. 1998) 
(unpublished table decision) 
Condominium Policies 
 Hartman v. Greenwich Walk Homeowners’ Ass’n, Inc., 71 F. App’x. 
135 (3d Cir. 2003) 
 Williams v. 5300 Columbia Pike Corp.,103 F.3d 122 (4th Cir. 1996) 
(unpublished table decision) 
 Ng v. Quiet Forest II Homeowners Ass’n, 87 F.3d 1321 (8th Cir. 
1996) (unpublished table decision) 
 Boodram v. Md. Farms Condo., 16 F.3d 408 (4th Cir. 1994) 
(unpublished table decision) 
Municipal Services 
 *The Comm. Concerning Cmty. Improvement v. City of Modesto, 
583 F.3d 690 (9th Cir. 2009) 
 Edwards v. Johnston Cnty. Health Dep’t, 885 F.2d 1215 (4th Cir. 
1989) 
 Southend Neighborhood Imp. Ass’n v. St. Clair Cnty., 743 F.2d 1207 
(7th Cir. 1984) 
Other 
 Greater New Orleans Fair Hous. Action Center v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. 
& Urban Dev., 639 F.3d 1078 (D.C. Cir. 2011) 
 Massbaum v. WNC Mgmt., 361 F. App’x. 904 (9th Cir. 2010) 
 Oti Kaga, Inc. v. S.D. Hous. Dev. Auth., 342 F.3d 871 (8th Cir. 2003) 
 Fair Hous. in Huntington Comm. Inc. v. Town of Huntington, 316 
F.3d 357 (2d Cir. 2003) 
 Jersey Heights Neighborhood Ass’n v. Glendening, 174 F.3d 180 (4th 
Cir. 1999)  
 S.-Suburban Hous. Center v. Greater S. Suburban Bd. of Realtors, 935 
F.2d 868 (7th Cir. 1991) 
 Vill. of Bellwood v. Dwivedi, 895 F.2d 1521 (7th Cir. 1990) 
 Latinos Unidos De Chelsea En Accion v. Sec’y of Hous. & Urban 
Dev., 799 F.2d 774 (1st Cir. 1986)  
